Understanding Pakistan

Violence forecast regarding the rise in Gas Prices

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Protests by residents seem likely in major cities, due to gas shortages. Given the political and economic climate, it is likely for certain interest groups and different political stakeholders to turn protests into civil unrest; in order to enhance their vested interest and jeopardize the government’s functioning.

Being aware of the foreseeable shortfall, the government as a pro-active measure is engaged with the association of textile owners in Karachi and the Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources is giving assurances regarding the steady supply of gas for industrial purposes during winter. It is even more essential to note that with regards to gas, the shortages and the supply crises are going to effect Sui Northern Gas Pakistan Limited (SNGPL) and not Sui Southern Gas Pakistan Limited (SSGPL) due to the assurances by the Ministry of Petroleum to the textile industries in Karachi; so the shortfalls in Karachi should not cause civil unrest. However, though the government is keen to maintain the supply of gas to household consumers during the shortfall, its delivery is questionable.

The government assessing public backlash against rising gas prices, transferred price regulation to OGRA and detached itself from the responsibility, also securing the IMF criterion of deregulation. This might be seen as a political move to alienate itself form the decision making. As evident in the recent past, the Supreme Court intervened in OGRA’s decision to raise petroleum prices, thus, deflating the protest and curbing public anger. The government might later on intervene in similar fashion to support public sentiment and regain confidence, that is, if civil unrest begins. Given the ongoing sugar crisis in the country (this being a greater concern for consumers), it is highly unlikely that protests regarding gas supply cuts will turn into acts of civil unrest, as the government wants to maintain their credibility and commitment. It is also important to note that gas supply shortages and price increases will not be the sole cause for civil unrest.

Another important factor is to distinguish between gas price increase and supply shortfall. For the latter situation, the Pakistani Government is being pro active in forecasting supply shortfalls and engaging with the industry to identify new sources, i.e. they are negotiating with the Qatari Government to import natural gas.

The Theological Doctrine Inspiring the Taliban

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Taliban in this modern day and age have become a phenomenon, which threaten the peace and livelihood of many individuals. The current impasse in Pakistan and the border regions of Afghanistan have left many developed nations with a fierce threat to their varied interests in the region. These self-proclaimed ‘students’ of Islam have demonized the religion by carrying out heinous acts and perpetrating terror amongst the local population. The Taliban of the current global structure are the illegitimate offshoot of the original ‘mujahedeen’ warriors, picked out from the region through Arab funding and indoctrinated with fundamentalist ideals with American help through the Pakistani border during the 80’s, in order to wage what was a much touted holy war against the then Soviet Union. Their religious legitimacy finds itself under question today merely because they are rebels without a cause that is supported by any major global power, since in actuality the religion of blood and martyrdom that they learnt so well when it was fed to them through propaganda was never an accurate representation of Islam.

It is the view of most moderate followers of Islam and indeed other organized religion that these Taliban dilute the actual aim of Islam, of which they have become self professed protagonists. The vulgarization of fundamental puritanical Islam, mixed with native and ethnic pre-modern values has gained them recognition amongst their stronghold of primitive tribal domains on both sides of the Durand line. However, the cost of such an adventure has had an adverse effect on the majority of the Muslim world, populated by human beings as rational as anywhere else on the planet, and has given rise to questions on various subjects and issues of Islam. Their promulgation of an Islamic order in these harsh anti-Islamic times has been heavily criticized in the Islamic scholarly world (Donovan, 2008); in no small part due to its similarities to tribal customs and its inaccuracies when compared to religion.

The vast majority of clerics, devoted to moderation, cite that the duties of a good Muslim are to adhere to Islamic practices and refrain from vices. And in Islam, just as all other recognized religion, it is a must to respect the sanctity of human life. Under such duties, unless there is an evident threat to Islam, the individual must act in a non-confrontational manner. The Taliban’s have detracted from the code of ethics prevalent in the region and have created an aggressive stance. The entire northern region of Pakistan along with several areas of Afghanistan have been held hostage at the behest of these self-proclaimed ‘students of Islam’, overriding centuries of Islamic intellectual legacy.

For the discussion on the theological beliefs of the Taliban to move forward, this essay will divulge into a deeper aspect of Islam, which would allow us to understand different forms of Islamic jurisprudence. Theology is the discipline reflecting on the body of doctrinal knowledge. This field endeavors to expand and construct on the various loopholes present in the society, in line with the religious edifice i.e. the Quran and the Hadith. Doctrinal knowledge is not infallible or eternal; therefore it is imperative to keep religious knowledge and religion separate. In contemporary fundamentalism, the segregation between the former and the latter has eroded, making the interpretation of religion as religion in itself (Albertini, 2003, p456). Jurisprudence forms an important part in the development of Islamic society. The questions of principles with their applications in accordance to the needs, is achieved through this method. Therefore, jurists are given the responsibility to make the ‘fiqh’ (jurisprudence) coherent with the ‘shariah’ (law).

The Sunni branch of Islam has four main schools of jurisprudence, where most of the literary knowledge is acquired. The earliest and perhaps the most progressive school is that of Imam Abu Hanifa, and this branch advocates qiyas (analogy) and istihan (juristic preference). A classic example could be the protection of mothers of illegitimate children from stoning until the period of gestation is fulfilled. The concept known as the ‘sleeping fetus’, interprets the Quranic punishment through qiyas, maintaining the sanctity of human life. The room for development of law within the Hanafi School expects its members to emulate the founder’s methodology, and not simply to regurgitate his decisions in verbatim (Albertini, 2003,p459).

The second school of jurisprudence is based upon the ideas of Imam Malik ibn Anas that emerged in protest to the excessive use of qiyas in the Hanafi School. Originally, the Maliki School consented to a blind adherence of Islamic practice as it was in Medina during the time of the prophet. This changed over time to produce more innovative sources. The notions of maslaha mursala (legitimate public interest) and istihab (presumption of continuity) were established in order to ensure innovation did not break with scriptural and legal ordinances. Maliki School of jurisprudence is commonly found in northern Africa, Sudan, Bahrain and Kuwait. It has been seen as being women friendly as it has many practices, which conform to a more modern lifestyle. For example the case of ‘khul’ permits the women to file for divorce without the consent of her husband, provided the correct evidence and material is presented. They have acquired the ‘sleeping fetus’ dictum and have further relaxed themselves from the founder’s stance.

The third school was formed under Imam Ibn Hanbal and is rather conservative. Followers of this particular branch resort to strict adherence of the Quran and the Hadith and permit analogy only after the inability to resolve the dispute through scripts and tradition. Their dominance is in present day Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman and this school has been influential through the backing of their respective states, amongst Middle Eastern scholarly circles (Albertini, 2003,p460).

The last prominent school in modern Islamic discourse was formed under Imam Ibn Idris Al-Shafi, and draws heavy inspiration in Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. They stand in between the Hanifis and the Malikis, with regards to their stance on religion. They generally reject juristic preference, but endorse analogy as long as it is derived from the primary source, and also insist on analogy being on illa (effective cause) that is clearly established in the Holy Scriptures. They also allow departure from previous precedents, similar to Hanafi’s, if the jurist has reached a better verdict in preserving the fundamentals. These schools though differ in their views and opinion, but do not form a confrontational scenario amongst each other; rather they compliment the adab al-ikhtilaf (ethics of disagreement) (Albertini, 2003,p461).

In modern day, a fifth strand of source of inspiration and guidance can be outlined, though it lacks textual background and scholarly material, it has become popular since the eighteenth century. Formed under the leadership of Ibn Abd Al-Wahab in the Arabian Peninsula, it rejected the practice of taqlid (emulation) and moved away from following any of the schools of jurisprudence. Interesting to note is that Ibn Abd Al-Wahab was raised and taught as a Hanbali, however, his beliefs began to diverge from that particular line of jurisprudence. If a parallel were to be drawn, the closest school to the Wahabi ideology would be Hanbali, as both advocate the strictest interpretation of Islam. In wahabism, none of the legal means developed by classical jurisprudence are accepted. Thus this implies a direct application of the Quran and Hadith, without any importance paid to historic precedents and limitations on the applicability of primary sources of law in individual cases; rendering the difference between sharia and fiqh obsolete (Albertini, 2003,p461).

The code of conduct in Islam divides clearly into five separate categories: fard (obligatory), mustahabb or mandub (not obligatory but recommended), mubah (neutral or permitted), makruh (not forbidden but discouraged), and haram (forbidden). Moreover, the Hanafi School distinguishes further by declaring fard and wajib, whereas the latter is near obligatory in duty but not divinely ordained. Similarly, Islam orders not all obligations to be fulfilled collectively, for example, carrying out jihad when not required is fard al-kifaya (an obligation satisfied in the name of all by being assumed by some) not fard al-ayn (essential obligation). The fifth category of conduct ‘haram’, even though being the strictest, has been open to scrutiny when decisions are taken regarding the chastisement of a Muslim if his or her ritual obligations are not being fulfilled. The earlier example of ‘sleeping fetus’ denotes this where the hanafi and the Mailki School have extended the period of gestation under the shelter of humanity and prevention of loss of human life. On the contrary, in Saudi Arabia and in Taliban era of Afghanistan the moral police publicly flogged men who are found outside the mosque during prayer times (Albertini, 2003,p462).

The paper revolves around the theological beliefs of the Taliban government of Afghanistan during 90’s; therefore, an understanding of the pre-1996 Afghan society needs to be understood. The country is perhaps the first to gain independence in the South Asian region in the year 1919. Established as a kingdom, it stood at the crossroads of cultures between south and central Asia. Since centuries the region and adjoining areas have produced scholars and authorities of Islam, who travelled to many countries spreading and promoting the religion. In 1896 a prominent ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Abdul Rahman was given the title of ‘Ziya Ul Millat wa ad-Din’ (the light of the nation and of religion). This Afghan ruler contributed significantly towards the consolidation of traditional religious establishments and brought them under state supervision (Magnus & Naby, 1998,p70). He had tried on many occasions to convert Shia Muslims to Sunni Islam, which resulted in either migration or marginalization of the Shia population. The Afghan society is predominantly Sunni and follows the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. Till about 1977 the dominance of this school of thought was included in every constitution drafted in Afghanistan. This on a social level also acted as a binding force for the Afghans to look east towards their Muslim brethrens who followed the same lineage of jurisprudence (Magnus & Naby, 1998,p71).

Afghanistan was mostly a rural and an agrarian society till the time of the Soviet invasion. Since the majority of the population was in villages, their access to religion has been through the word of the local Imam or Mullah. The makeshift mosques served as the only hub of religious and indeed educational discourse, and the Friday prayers and the sermons that preceded them became the most influential tools in the lives of the local Afghans. The local Imams had primarily been the only source of religion, which undermined the greatness of the religion, as most of them were equipped with a very basic set of knowledge. This has traditionally gained the village Mullahs a lot of respect within their society and has played as an integral part in the politics of the country. As Afghanistan has pre-dominantly been a pasthun majority area, the pashtunwali (pashtun tribal code) has interfered and overlapped with all customs and practices of the country. It has been seen as an integral part in aiding the religion in areas of dispute. The code primary themes cover behavior and relations within the society, promoting a patriarchal and male chauvinistic approach. Themes such as melmastia and mehrmapalineh (concerning hospitality to guest), nanawati (right to asylum), badal (blood revenge), tureh (bravery), meranah (manhood), imandari (righteousness), ghayrat (defense of property and honor), and namus (defense of the honor of women) have ruled over the hearts and minds of tribal pashtuns (Goodson, 2001,p416).

Since there were no Madrasa of well repute in Afghanistan, motivated and determined scholars would travel to Bokhara or India to gain a quality education. This brought about the introduction of the Deobandi School into the Afghan society. The madrasa at Deoband quickly flourished due to its strict adherence to Hanafi Interpretation and new educational methods (Magnus & Naby, 1998,p76). Early Afghan scholars could spend about ten to twelve years at the Deoband covering a vast syllabus of Islam, which included the Hanafi fiqh, Arab and Persian literature along with Greek and Arab philosophy. Deoband amongst many other unique characteristics maintained a strict adherence to orthodoxy and rejected bid’at (additions to religion). It also distanced itself from the cult of saints; however, it incorporated the Sufi order especially of the naqshbandi and qadiri lineage (Roy, 1990,p57). This resonated with traditonal Afghani islamic practices as such orders were common over there. Similarly during the struggle for independance in India agasint the British Raj, Deoband prepared a very islamic framework to defend the fall of the Ottoman Calihpate. This drive was also echoed in Afghanistan by the initiative to carry out anti British operations in the frontier regions of Afghanistan. Whilst its primary goal of protection of the Caliphate turned into a rather futile exercise as the Turks decided to rid themselves of it, the drive resulted in the creation of many deobandi madrasas along the current Pak-afghan border developing students to defend and resist british imperialism. The deoband school of religious studies, propogated a pan islamic sub-continent and was against the creation of Pakistan. This idea reflected their vision to envisage a mulsim hegemony in the entire region, therefore, the idea of nationalism was more of a Salafi tradtion, and limiting the scope of islam within a country was discouraged by the school (Roy, 1990,p58). The above mentioned point, will perhaps be an important factor in distiguishing the propogations of the Taliban beliefs.

In the twentieh century, the status qou of the Afghani society and politics was severely disprupted. In the 70’s the king faced a coup and was exiled from the land leaving administration in the hands of the his cousin and a western ally. Politcal turbulence continued till the 80’s when finally the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan and set the stage for the cold war. The American government with the help of the Pakistani administration and Saudi Arabian funding succesfully raised an army of various ethnicities, under the banner of Islam. The Pakistani administration provided the techinical know how and strategic cover to the mujahideen warriors along with manpower in the shape of madrasa students and even some paramilitary troops. The Saudis invested through heavy funding and exported radicals from their land into Afghanistan. Saudi arabia not only exported money but helped build a wahabi party in neighbouring Pakistan by the name of Itehad –e- islami, which spread the salafi version of Islam amongst the Afghan wariors thus transfering the wahabi movement onto another region. The resulted in tension amongst various ethnic Afghans, as the wahabi ideology was viewed as foreign, and it disregarded both sufi and local traditions, however, under the greater good of expelling non-muslims i.e. the Soviets out of Afghanistan this resentment died out (Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, 2002, p83).

The war between Soviet Union and America through their Afghan proxies lasted for a decade, but its consequences lived on forever. After the Soviet withdrawal, western interest groups turned their back on the region, leaving the children i.e mujahideen, of war unchecked. With Afghanistan in shambles, the economy crippled and with other regional players influencing the upcoming political setup, the country fell back into civil war. The mujahideen warriors were constructed of roughly about eight ethnicities, and Sunni muslims were in majority. After the soviet retreat, each ethnic group held their locations in order to secure it and, fought the other side at any oppurtunity. Unity was at the lowest, and religious zeal was converting into material gains and power politics. Pakistan being the most connected and affected neighbour groomed and backed the taliban to take over the capital Kabul, in order to have an army of its own creation serve its regional interest. The non pashtun fighters who had arrived during the mujhaideen war not only brought wahabi influence, but brought with themselves ample amounts of foreign exchange to fund the Taliban adventure. The Taliban emerged in mid-1994. The most commonly believed account of their origin is that the core of the movement was formed at the moment when a group of local religious leaders took up arms against a commander who had abducted and raped two women in Kandahar in July 2004 (Rashid 2002,p25). The institutional spine of the Taliban has always been the network of madrasas in Pakistan and to some extent in Afghanistan. The teachers, alumni and religious students from these madrasas, which also happened to be predominantly Pashtun formed part of the Taliban. The Sunni religious leadership is not knit into tight hierarchical organizations, but rather operate in loose networks based on personal loyalties. This is exactly why the ability of the Taliban movement, in the mid-1990s, to mobilize a relatively coherent army with one leadership bank, influential throughout most of Afghanistan’s Pashtun south, was so impressive. The Taliban based themselves from madrasas in the Deobandi tradition, aiming at a society based on the Koran and the Sunnah – the practice of the Prophet (Harpviken, 2006,p6).

The Taliban’s first programmatic declarations were based on wide reaching popular consultations, and can be summed up in three basic points: to re-establish peace, disarm the population, and conform to sharia-law, defending the Islamic heritage of Afghanistan. Importantly, the frame of reference for all these objectives was the Afghan state. There was no reference – explicit or implicit – to the global Islamic community of believers. The objectives seemed attractive to a large share of the Afghan population, although many had reservations both about the blending of Islam and politics and about the Pashtun dominance (Harpviken, 2006,p9). One could see many similarities between the Taliban and the Wahabi movement that had spawned them. Both mobilized muster force on the pretext of jihad, martyrdom and removal of un-Islamic governments in order to establish an Islamic state. Similarly, both insisted on the necessity of ijtihad (interpretation) as being the most vital and correct form in developing Islam. The extreme prohibition of music and celebrations advocated by Wahabism is clearly evident in the Taliban version of Islam. Moreover, the establishment of the department for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice reflected a mirror image of the Wahabi setup in Saudi Arabia (Marsden, 2002,p73).

The taliban’s endevour to remain committed on jihad, even though there primary school of thought does not stress on the urgency of jihad, is seen as merely politcal and ethnic. If the Taliban had fallen susceptible to the western pressure and had relaxed their views on governance and Afghanistan, then a rebellion amongst their file and ranks was expected. The armed forces of the Taliban were fighting for an islamic cause, however, the pasthunwali code was a determining factor as well. The massacre of mazar –e – sharif by the Taliban forces was a clear result of their ethnic priorities lying before their religious goals. It was renowned for the taliban to remove any non pashtun official from the government position and place a taliban commander, defying merit and equality. The inability of the taliban to form a legalised and legitmate government, refelected their distance from knowledge. It became more and more evident that this was a band of illiterate ruffians that had finally been allowed to run havoc, all under the unfortunate banner of a religion that found its reputation tainted by the very people that claimed to study it.

The ad hoc style of administration in the Taliban was not commanded by any school of thought, in fact classical jurisprudence stresses the need of good governance more than anything else, when running an islamic state. Their form of governance gave more weightage on estabilishing a state which in letter proclaims islam, however, no substantial mechanism or method of statecraft was devised. Most of the Talibans carried the title of a mullah, which was self conferred, and passed verdicts without consulations and religious backing. Mullah Omar, the commander of the Taliban government, self proclaimed himself to be Amir ul Momineen (ruler of the faithful) without having full islamic qualifications. The Taliban ruled the country without the presence of a constitution, therefore, they derived legitimacy, law and policy through verbal decrees of Mullah Omar. In a famous incident of a gross violation of human rights, one of their ministers was reported to have said that a ‘heavenly order was publicly administered on the culprit’ (Kleiner, 2000). Although parallels may be drawn with Mr Bush and his alleged conversations with God, that is a discussion reserved for another essay.

The native form of shariah has been part of Afghan culture since many centuries, aided with the pasthunwali style of administration. Local mullahs and qazis (judges) decided upon local issues and passed verdicts in light of whatever limited amounts of knowledge were available to them, religious or general. Due to the remoteness of most of the villages, this practice remained unchecked by the state and therefore culminated in a de facto religious hoop, where any beard spoke the truth and larger beards were right. The Taliban simply regurgigated this village practice onto the national level, without having sufficient religious discourse to elaborate on many of the issues. The taliban publicly lashed women for adultery or acts relating to adultery, amputated limbs of men found guilty of robbery, alleged murders were shot or hanged in town centres and their bodies left to decay as warnings to the public. The few mentioned above do not reflect either the deobandi or the hanafi or the wahabi prescribed methods of carrying out justice. At this point in time, it became painfully obvious that these rulers lacked the capacity to rule.

Moreover, these acts according to classic islamic jurisprudence can hold the incumbent ruler or government responsible and result in compulsory retribution. A loose link is usually traced to such punishments, as the Quran referes to certain forms of punishment for acts decalred haram. However, they vary from the above method, and the execution and delivery of justice is always derived from jurisprudence; which the Taliban government conveniently failed to acknowledge, under the cloak of self percieved puritanical Islam. The justice carried out in the country were through jirgas (local councils) and the criterion of a judge was based on tribal norms rather than religious background or merit. In spirit the jirgas placed pasthunwali values higher, and justfied their custom laced verdicts through literal quranic and Hadith translations picked out to suit particular scenarios. Taliban as understood now avoided the introduction of emulation, as it could have undermined their local practices. Although the majority of the fighters were briefly educated in deobandi madrasa’s, by the time they reached the streets to take control of the governance, their desire to adhere to islamic principles would take a back seat to their primary education, that of a warrior trained to die for glory.

The Talibans had unfortunately no notion of communal scholarly quest that has a free space of inquiry and remains by nature open ended, which is common practice in common madrasas. Even though the Taliban strictly conformed to traditions of early islam, they conveniently mixed their pasthunwali practice and diluted their puritanical message. Today one of the finest samples of ijtihad are produced in far eastern muslim countries, that are geographically remote from the birth place of Islam. Modern civil law of western derivations, combined with the principles of muslim jurisprudence, allow them to claim the right to incorporate their pre islamic customs. Drawing reflections back to how the arabs in the 6^th and the 7^th century were allowed to retain their customary practices that fell in line with islamic principles. To the fundamentalist and the Taliban, such practices were an outragous disrespect to islam’s legacy and there was no need or indeed allowance for adaptations or alterations. Their perception of law is uniformity and rigidness through the entire islamic world, remaining unchanged in all ages. The Taliban had little interest in the ethics of a muslim and their priority was declaring holy war as manditory for all, and that punishment should be carried out in a gruesome manner to prevent further moral decay. The Taliban sharia served as a daily reminder of the administrations rigid and uncompromising religious interpretation. The crafting and expansion of rules through qiyas was seen as a potential threat which could weaken their control over their uneducated force and fellow Afghans. At this point, the Orwellian Animal farm had come full circle, and fellow animals were being led to the slaughter to serve as examples to the populus of the farm.

In conclusion the Taliban ideology thrived due to classical jurisprudence being marginalised and basic puritanical actions provided short term relief to the war torn nation. The ideological doctrine that inspired the taliban government sadly does not exist, as they were unable to produce substantial material backing their method of governance. They were a prodigy of the Pakistani Inter services Intelligence at the behest of Saudi oil dipped dollars shipped to the illiterate tribes in US wrapping paper. This creation gone wrong became a safe haven for the Al-Qaeda, and their simplistic aims became more similar to dictatorial conquistidors rather than religious freedom fighters. On the platform of religion they commited acts that vulgarised islam and undermined the religion’s notion of tolerant and just governance. They were created out of Deobandi madrassa’s, exposed to Wahabism, funded by saudi arabia, and supported by the Pakistan. In the middle of the mix whilst it was about to set was dropped the elixir of the illiterate, and so powerful a catalyst it proved to be that today we find the very meaning of a religion held hostage by a band of people working like a mafia.

The Taliban today are openly notorious, hence their legacy no longer extends itself under the guise of religious defence. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Taliban are an open alternative to the state economy, one that allows for a unique fusion of chauvenistic gun touting along with the earning of a wage through loot and plunder that amounts to several times the income earnt by any lawful member of society. If any man joins the Taliban around the heights of the Khyber pass today, they do so under a very clear and simple understanding. Long gone are the ideas of religion and defence. Today, it is all about the notoriety that comes with being a real man, providing for your numerous wives by stealing from the pro American extablishment and owning a gun in the process. A Beard helps, because it is the way of the Pashtun, not because it is a symbol of Islam. If ever the world is rid of these students of illiteracy, every nation and religion shall breathe a sigh of relief, with Afghanistan and Islam sighing loudest of all.

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Federal structure and ethnic friction in Pakistan

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The construction of a federal society and constitution in Pakistan has been turbulent throughout history. All the constitutions of the state have arrived at solutions addressing different aspects of federalism, thus, some failed in producing a federal government whilst others were impractical. However, to determine the success and failure of the federal setup one needs to look at the legal disabilities of the documents and draw accounts of factors leading to disturbance in society. Along with the constitutional answer to the problem of federalism in Pakistan, understanding the need of the society and the political background would be essential. A viable setup would limit the role of centre in relation to provinces under the strength of the constitution safeguarding their share. Issues of national concern remain under strict central control, but units should enjoy autonomy over the resources and population under them, whereas, receiving their due share of contribution towards the nation-state. In Pakistan the centre has maintained a strict control over provinces and has interfered right from the beginning. The first and foremost example was of dismissal of several ministries in the provinces of NWFP, Sind and East Pakistan in the early years of creation. This set a precedent for future documents and legislation in legitimising centre’s intervention into provincial matters creating an undemocratic norm.

Much of Pakistan’s political history has run on military might than constitutional will, resulting in individualistic and personality based governance than ideological principles, creating a unitary system. The absence of stable representative government and democracy for elongated periods in the infant years of Pakistan’s development tilted the control over to the centre. Since control over centre was of high importance in determining the power struggle between various forces. The invaders of the constitution never allowed the evolution of the multi ethnic state into a nation as fears of insecurity and weakened control extended their powers onto the provincial subjects. Pakistan’s failure to produce a constitution till 1956 strengthened the grip of centre in provincial subjects, and when the document finally produced; the inefficiency and inadequacy of provisions led to political chaos and military takeover. The Ayubian rule stamped the position and presence of the army and bureaucracy in the functioning of the government with an authoritarian constitution.

The inability to address East Pakistan’s fear of suppression from West Pakistan, specifically Punjab, and the mishandling of the uprising led to civil war. The people of East Pakistan had begun the actual momentum of independence and creation of a separate Muslim homeland, with freedom and autonomy to govern self issues. The West Pakistani population- migrants and natives joined the cause to prevent themselves from the ethnic massacre taking place in through out of northern India. Therefore, the Bengali populous deserved more than what the state had provided them, even in times of national crisis and calamities the province received the underdog status. The famous language riots of 1952 in efforts to raise Bengali at par with Urdu as the national language were systematically suppressed, dimming chances of interprovincial harmony. One unit Pakistan was a simple and perfect tool for establishing the writ of the federal government but subsequently fuelled the need for independence in the hearts of East Pakistanis (Tepper, Pakistan and the Consequences of Bangladesh, 1973). While the Indian federation after the partition of 1947 allowed for linguistic heterogeneity, Pakistan miscalculated and created two separate units. Many efforts were made to reconcile the two units of Pakistan before the 1971 secession of Bangladesh. Signposts throughout Dhaka in Bengali were placed signifying West Pakistan’s acceptance to the linguistic differences. Though forty percent of the bureaucratic jobs were allocated for West Pakistan, the provision of Urdu being the official language could not host many candidates. From 1968 to 1970, only 2% of the top military elite were Bengalis and regardless of their higher population, received only 36% of the federal budget (Adeney, 2007). The Bengali Language Movement of the 1960’s turned into a quest for independence, and finally in 1971, after brutal death of hundreds of thousands of Bengali and Indian intervention, Bangladesh came into being. A simple solution of providing more provincial authority and right of language would have saved the East Pakistani loyalty and nationalism.

The beginning of the ‘third republic’ in 1973 symbolised hope and vision for the new nation of Pakistan. A detailed structure carving out necessary arrangement for the empowerment of the provinces was seen, as Pakistan saw its first truly representative form of government. The evolutionary process lasted for merely four years when a military coup in July 1977 led by General Zia Ul Haq, hampered the efforts of reaching a viable multi dimensional Pakistan. Military dictatorship bred hatred not just between centre and state, but also amongst provinces. It has been noted that whilst state-building requires a high level of centralized power, nation building calls for a dispersal of authority and an emphasis on responsiveness in the political system. Due to the military regimes, the latter has always been compromised.

A further dent in the federal-provincial relation has been the financial distribution of wealth amongst provinces. The Raisman Award in 1951 and the National Finance Commission Award in 1990 highlighted disparity of share in the pooled income of taxes and income from natural resources (Ghaus-Pasha & Bengali, 1999). The division of the federal budget is on the basis of population. Though smaller provinces require more than what they earn, for further development and economic prosperity. Due to the method of division of funds, a lot of grievances have been surfaced all across the country. Punjab is allotted the highest percentage of the Federal Budget even though it’s the developed of the four provinces. Since the province of Sind earns the highest revenue, the Sindi’s argue that the division should be on the basis of revenue generation, while NWFP and Baluchistan demand the division on the basis of backwardness. Allotment of funds should not be on the basis of the population but on requirement of the provinces to sustain development and uplift growth. A good federal system is tailored according to the need of the country’s geo-political and socio-cultural requirements, where at times population proportionality is not the criteria for receiving the federal share, as in Pakistan. The 1973 constitution established a Council of Common Interest providing relief to provinces over areas of wealth distribution, and proposed a 90% allocation on the basis of population whilst the 10% on the needs of the province, but the Pakistani political dynamics never allowed such implementations to occur (Adeney, 2007).

The fact that Sind provides the highest level of revenue, Baluchistan gas and NWFP hydroelectric power but the provinces of Punjab benefits from the resources and the higher federal budget has caused all the other provinces to articulate grievances against Punjab and Punjabis in particular. The bureaucracy and army was overwhelmingly of Punjabi ethnicity and their repeatedly occurrences into power with Punjab as a province receiving the greatest share of resources had led to ethnic frustration. Another prevailing federal challenge faced by Pakistan is due to scarcity of water and the construction of the Kalabagh Dam in Punjab. Punjab argues that the main generation of revenue is from agriculture and seeing as it is the most populated one it should be allowed to construct the dam. However, the Sindi’s and Baluchi’s would not be able to receive the necessary irrigation facilities and would result in a collapse of their economy. It is important that sacrifices are made in the name of national unity and sovereignty while Punjab is unwilling to make them.

The latest development in the field of federalism has been the incorporation of the Legal Framework Order into the 1973 constitution. The Musharraf rule aimed to overcome the problems of its military predecessors and acquired a more democratic role in the running of the government. It introduced the local government and spread grass root democratic values, allowing participation at the lowest level. However, this left the centre and the local government with authority and the status of provincial autonomy further diminished. Many politicians have argued that an increase in the power of the local government would be a positive development if the powers of the provincial governments were enhanced simultaneously. On the other hand, many argue that due to the corruption of the provincial governments it is best to leave the power with the local governments. All in all, in a federation where centralization has only lead to conflict and secession of provinces in the past, can only lead to conflict in the absence of more provincial autonomy (Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan, 2007).

The development of Gwadar port in the south of Baluchistan and the sudden influx of Punjabi workers revived the sentiments of hatred against the Punjabis and the government. The profits of development of Baluchistan are enjoyed by the army and the Punjabis, Baluch are faced with a territorial invasion by the government, this lead to a violent outbreak against Musharraf at the end of 2005. Musharraf launched an army operation killing 72 people and leaving 227 injured (Adeney, 2007). As mentioned earlier, the sentiments of the Baluchi’s were exasperated due to the massacre of an influential tribal leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti. The federal design cannot address the issues of ethnic representation in the army or the bureaucracy but mechanisms of consociation do.

The spirit of the Pakistan resolution of 1940 has been quashed over and over by not allowing the transformation of Pakistan into a loose federation. The Pakistan Oppressed National Movement comprising of various ethno-nationalist groups have manifested a three point agenda on protecting their provincial and economic rights. Firstly, the establishment of a loose federation of autonomous and sovereign Punjabi, Sindi, Baluchi, Pathan, and Seraiki population and secondly, that each should be labelled as states in accordance to the spirit of 1940 resolution; thirdly, the federation should be vested with powers conferred by mutual agreement and consent (Kundi, 2000).

The trickledown effect of constitutional and administrative ineffectiveness has transformed the face of ethnic harmony amongst the Pakistani populous. Pakistan’s population mix resides in provinces under the following percentage: 57% Punjab, 24% Sind, 14% NWFP, 5% Baluchistan. However, this figure is not representing the actual ethnicity presence in Pakistan, as for example the province of Sind is homeland for two ethnic groups i.e. Sindi’s and Muhajir’s. After the implementation the 1973 constitution, the provinces were given enough autonomy to change the provincial languages. The adoption of Sindhi as the working-language led to the formation of Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Riots broke out by the end of 1980’s and the leader of MQM demanded that the Mohajirs should be recognized as the fifth nationality in Pakistan (Adeney, 2007).

The federal structure in Pakistan has not been truly representative of the ethnic divisions in Pakistan. Distinguishing ethnicity in Pakistan is primarily on the basis of territory and linguistics and ethnicity, as race and religion are more or less homogenous. Successive efforts by the governments and constitutions have failed to address the existence of various ethnic groups in Pakistan. Efforts have always been directed towards central or provincial authorities, excluding the representation of significant ethnic groups and therefore the process of nation building has been slow-moving. This issue has not only given rise to political instability but also to regionalism in the country. Under the existing majoritarian democracy, it is in-evitable for a Punjabi dominated party to form government at centre as to their sheer size of population. Similarly, the First Past the Post electoral voting system does not account for the different ethnic groups residing in the constituencies. The Indian model of heterogeneity in their answer to federalism has created momentum and hopes in the Pakistani process of nationalism. For example, the Muhajir population of Sind are larger in number than the ethnically Baluch population but reside under the province of Sind. Arguments and movements for separate autonomous region bearing the Muhajir population have come up throughout the latter half of Pakistani history. As they fail to understand the reasoning behind the existing disparity of ethnicities that are less in number, yet receive more subsidiaries and attention from the state.

However, the anti federalists in the centre have repeatedly denied such demands and authorities have also resorted to state intervention in curbing violence. Such ethnic groups have gained power through political manoeuvres and elections and along with the instable forms of governance and military takeovers, received undue advantage of the centre’s attention. Such regionalist forces and parties due to inefficiency of the setup have bred hatred amongst ethnicities and have made the Pakistani political dynamics volatile (Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan, 2007). Federal politics has not only been between state and centre but within states as well, therefore, harmony at ground zero level of politics has never existed. The transition to democracy for a new born state is a difficult process and require due diligence. Especially given the ethnic mix of Pakistan, special care needs to be given on security and autonomy of these groups. The system of federalism is perhaps the best fit solution but it needs to be tailored according to the demands of the society.

Recommendations have been made on ensuring Pakistan’s federal polity. Firstly, the abolition of the concurrent list as they have been misused; the provinces did not have their fair share to legislate on those lists due to centre’s heavy involvement. This should be replaced by simply creating federal subjects in consultation with the provinces and the residual power should reside with the provinces. Then, the involvement of senate in the legislative process should be of a more active nature, with powers to amend, initiate and repeal a bill. Though this process would delay the working of the state but will ensure equal opportunity and sovereignty in the decision making process. The distribution of wealth should be divided on the basis of need to the province than their population size, with approval of the senate for each province (Ghaus-Pasha & Bengali, 1999). Along with these constitutional implementations an expansion in the current number of provinces is required.

The need for division and empowerment of ethnic groups on the basis of linguistics, the existing territories should be further divided. An example would be of the Seraiki belt being separated from mainland Punjab and similarly creation of a separate province for the Urdu speaking population in Sind. These recommendations would not just ensure a smooth functioning of the state system, but help in establishing a strong national identity within Pakistan. This process of empowerment would be hollow and disastrous if the responsible democratic process is not ensured within the republic. The need for support of positive political ideology and maturity is essential whilst maintaining inter ethnic harmony. Pakistan in its sixty years of independence has been far from the process of national reconciliation and certain power groups have left vacuums in the system. The constitutional guarantee is a key tool in ensuring all the afore-mentioned which would only be induced through a national will and determination. A process of systematic development and revolution would be vital in solving the quagmire of political and ethnic tensions prevailing in the country.

Economic predictions and forecast during the Musharraf regime

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Faisal Cheema in his occasional paper produced in 2004, highlights key indicators to develop a sustainable economy. He clearly indentifies areas, which needed concern from the regime in order to avoid macro economic instability. Despite improvement in all sectors of the economy, it is at the take-off stage[1] and faces many challenges that still need to be addressed. Pakistan’s poverty rate continues to rise. Unemployment in Pakistan has been aggravated due to constraints on public expenditures in recent years. A major contributing factor to growing impoverishment is Pakistan’s population growth rate of 2.6 percent per annum that will lead, according to one estimate, to a doubling of the population by 2020. Controlling the population growth rate is fundamental to improving per capita income (Cheema, May 2004).

In the future, the performance of Pakistan’s economy will depend upon the interplay of domestic, regional, and international factors[2]. First, on the domestic front, the performance of the economy depends upon the continuity of structural reforms imposed by the military government of General Musharraf. Success in continuing implementation of governance reforms, police reforms, banking sector reforms, administrative reforms, civil service reforms, and so on, will determine the future course of action (Cheema, May 2004,).

Second, political stability is a determining factor for macroeconomic stability. The political parties, parliament, the independent press, and a fair and impartial judiciary all need to be strengthened in order to achieve and sustain higher growth rates. High growth rates occurred under military governments (Przeworski & Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic Growth, 1993), but sustained high growth rates can only be achieved in a strong democracy, which has a built-in system of checks and balances necessary for development.

Third, there is need to foster inter-provincial and inter-sectional harmony in Pakistan to sustain a proper climate for overall economic development. Smaller provinces must be given a fair, adequate recompense of their tax contributions as a share of federal resources. Political leadership in these provinces must stop inciting the population against the central government and other provinces, as well as avoiding incitement of the violent religious sectarianism that has undermined public security. An improving law and order situation will help in attracting foreign direct investment in the country (Cheema, May 2004).

Finally, the international image of the country needs improvement. In recent years, Pakistan’s image in the international community has been damaged due to the rise of violent extremist and fundamentalist elements in the society. This has aggravated the decline of foreign investment in Pakistan.

Globally, the relationship with the United States and international financial institutions remains crucial to the performance of Pakistan’s economy. As far as the United States is concerned, there is need for Pakistan to cultivate a long-term, cooperative relationship. This will help Pakistan in receiving US investment, but also is a key determinant for Pakistan’s relations with the international financial institutions. To maintain a positive long-term relationship with the United States, Pakistan must control extremist elements in its society and continue its cooperation in the war on terrorism, the central US foreign policy concern at this time. The Musharraf government, which is a step in the right direction, banned many extremist organizations but there still is a need to monitor such elements closely in the future. Finally, the issue of nuclear proliferation must be resolved (Zaidi A. , occasional paper, 2004).

The IMF and the World Bank have shown satisfaction with Pakistan’s economic performance in recent years (Abed, 2003). The improved relationship with the IMF will help Pakistan in poverty alleviation and macroeconomic stabilization. Likewise, the World Bank will help Pakistan in continuing and maintaining structural reforms in the major sectors of its economy. The experience of developing countries with IMF and World Bank involvement in their economies has shown mixed results. The proponents of these institutions argue that IMF and World Bank assistance is necessary in solving the economic problems of the member countries in order to keep its economy afloat. But opponents of the IMF and World Bank roles in the economies of developing countries make a case that these institutions have created more problems for the member countries than they solve, condemning their failure to alleviate poverty (Easterly, 2001).

They argue that these institutions are politicized. They especially criticize the “conditionality’s” that these institutions attach to loans to debtor countries. To them, these conditionality’s are a major impediment to human development in the member countries (Cheema, May 2004).

They argue that conditionality’s are often self-contradictory and complicate the economic environment of member countries. Pakistan is a case in point. “On the one hand, the IMF and the World Bank expect Pakistan to do much for the alleviation of the poverty, whose one manifestation is a high rate of unemployment, and are ready to fund such efforts, and on the other, they insist on downsizing and rapid privatization of public sector enterprises along with deep cuts in public spending.” (Easterly, 2001) Furthermore, opponents criticize the IMF and World Bank for pushing Pakistan to adopt the “Washington Consensus” agenda that emphasizes economic liberalization and deregulation of the economy, compounding its economic problems (Cheema, May 2004).

· Understanding the Take-Off school

The take-off school is the theory behind identifying growth and reaching sustainable levels of achievement in the economy. It considers various factor per se, the role of the society and the economic and political system present. Being dynamic in nature it understands, it assesses the social framework and therefore, has been relevant in the case of Pakistan. The aspect necessary to understand is the categories in which it describes growth, as they have been applicable in the case of Pakistan. The theory breaks growth into five stages and reflects on how a state moves from being agrarian in nature, to self sufficient and sustainable market economy. Firstly, exists a traditional society whose structure is developed within limited production functions. Ad hoc innovations in trade, industry, and agriculture are used to raise the productivity. However, a ceiling exists on such a society to not be able to grow fully due to lack of technology and regularity. More emphasis within these societies is given to agriculture, as it is related closely to the hierarchical social structure. Landowners maintain their grip over political centers and influence the working of the state through their capacity (Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 1990,p5). In reference to Pakistan, although the traditional society discuses the pre-Newtonian[3] attitude, such fiefdoms and structures exist in the rural. The hold of feudalism and tribalism dominates and dictates the lives of many individuals in the rural belt. Laws of economy and society are dictated by native traditions than national laws.

The second stage is the pre-conditions for take off reflecting at the transition of the traditional society in acquiring technological advancements in agriculture and productions. This is partly due to external influence of other advanced societies, creating a causal link with the outside world and opening of markets. The idea of development comes about; as it is considered promote national dignity, private profit and general welfare. New entrepreneurs spring up with growing financial institutions and mobilizing the capital market. Investment is increased in the communications and transport sector widening the scope of commerce. However, this condition does not eliminate the traditional society and the both function side by side in improving the general condition (Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 1990,p6). A balance of political, social and economic values is created, defining a national strategy in some cases, especially in the case of Pakistan. To resonate the theory, Pakistan under Musharraf under went this stage as foreign capital and influence allowed, investors and multinationals to invest in Pakistan. The urban centers saw a ride in human capital development and certain services sector of the economy started to thrive. Namely, the telecommunications industry saw foreign buying and privatization of many sectors was becoming common.

The take-Off stage is the establishment of a modern society. Forces of economic progress expand and dominate the society, and institutional structure is laid down to compliment robust growth. As Rostow highlights, the take-off stage in Britain and United States marked the technological advancement and development in industry and agriculture through series of modernization (Rostow, The Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth, 1963). Similarly, also the political power recognizing the importance of economic prosperity, and inculcating the implications of economic success in they’re decision making. During this stage new industries expand rapidly, which profits yielded being ploughed back to the development and growth of the sector. The trickle down affects causes workers to accumulate more disposable income and either opt for savings or acquire other services within the economy. This expands on the economic activity and dormant sectors, or un-used natural resources are exploited through private investment (Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, 1960).

This is followed by the drive to maturity where steady sustained growth drives the economy towards complete modernization. About 20% of the national income is invested back into the economy through various economic activities, increasing output in relation to the increase in population. The make up of the economy changes, as newer advanced units, with bigger investments, replace inefficient industries. The national economy begins to seep into the global economy and starts taking part in global economics. Much of the technological import is now developed at home and exports are matched with competitiveness, balancing of the necessary units of production with increased outputs. The key to this stage is the time and consistency the economy needs, as the perquisite for this level is to allow the previous stage to sustain for over half a century and wash out the in efficiencies’. This stage identifies the independence of the economy to produce on the basis economic choice and political necessity, rather then technological or institutional constraints (Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 1990). The stage also requires political maturity to accompany the growth and sustainable development, with addressing all the social sectors of the economy. To create a living example, the economy of India is reaching a maturity stage, where to a certain extent, the above-mentioned features are being demonstrated or applied.

The final stage is referred to the age of high mass consumption, where leading sectors shift towards durable consumer goods and services. As the maturity stage elevates the economy into stabilization, the structure of society begins to change as well. Proportion of urban population increase and so does the number of skilled worker per capita. Increased resources are allocated to social welfare and security, since technological advancement is achieved, economies tend to cater to consumer services, and acquire a welfare nature. Economies at this stage, have passed through the development in primary and secondary sector, therefore, the services sectors is given priority. Consumer needs become the driving force for further growth in the economy (Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 1990).

· What went wrong towards the end of the regime: highlighting the mismanagement

Until the October 2008 economic crisis, the Musharraf government’s economic policies were generally perceived to be a great success. In fact, Pakistan appeared to have one of the best economic growth records in its region. Based on these perceptions, there was widespread optimism that the country might finally break out of its post-independence cycle of boom and bust to achieve the type of high sustained economic growth that India has been experiencing since the early 1990s (Looney R. , The Musharraf Paradox: The Failure of an Economic Success Story, 2008).

The reforms introduced during the Musharraf administration were designed to address many of Pakistan’s economic problems. In particular, they targeted the country's massive poverty, stagnant economic growth, deteriorating institutional framework and weak governance structures. Musharraf ‘s regime embraced globalization, structural reforms, and opened the country to investment and trade[4]. Cities and towns seemed to be booming, and the country managed to recover impressively from the devastating earthquake of 2005. Towards the end of the Musharraf era, the economy grew at abnormal rates between 7% and 7.5% being termed as amongst the fastest growing economies. The share of industry output was rising in the GDP from 22.6% in 2000 to 22.7% in 2006. Though minimal in nature but the regime claimed to have achieved an astronomical figure. The annual percentage growth in industrial value added doubled; the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP increased by three percentage points. The services sector posted an impressive performance, with annual growth of the value added in services nearly doubling over seven years (Looney R. , Failed to Take off: An Assessment of Pakistan's October 2008 Economic Crisis,

2009).

Yet by early 2008, the economy was in trouble. It faced a rapid loss of foreign exchange reserves, mounting inflationary pressures and declining rates of growth (Khan & Saqib, 2009). What went wrong? While some analysts blame external factors, such as rising international commodity and oil prices, global recession and change in the American interest, others argue that long-term domestic mismanaged economic factors caused Pakistan’s sudden Economic collapse (Looney R. , The Musharraf Paradox: The Failure of an Economic Success Story, 2008). The Musharraf government’s economic team was lead by Shaukat Aziz[5], who turned the economic into a highly consumer based market. The lack of infrastructural development and commitment towards regulating in-efficiencies mixed with income disparity took a heavy toll on the economy. The government under their rule proclaimed to have increased the number of mobile phone users in the country. The achievement, highlighted as the biggest success story, turned against the national economy in the longer run. Since the figures of the communication sector were included in the GDP, it allowed the government to claim growth in the economy. However, most of the companies were foreign owned, and due to lack of restriction on flight of capital, unfortunately, the people of Pakistan were not the beneficiary. A mixture of liberalization and market openness left the economy vulnerable to exit of foreign capital (Amjad, 2007).

The interventionist policies by the State Bank of Pakistan, under the directives of the government, led to de valuation of currency and rising cost of imports. Which in turn meant less investment of capital goods and slowing the process of industrialization. On the other hand, privatization of key industries allowed foreign takeovers with revenues earned leaving the economy. this also aided the income disparity and creating a weaker link between economic growth and poverty reduction.

The above-mentioned ‘take-off school’ contends that the ‘Musharraf strategy’ compounded many pre- existing structural problems, creating serious imbalances throughout the economy. These imbalances continue to destabilize Pakistan’s economy and its society are the source of much of the country’s current violence and discontent (Looney R. , The Musharraf Paradox: The Failure of an Economic Success Story, 2008).

The leading proponent of this school in Pakistan, Shahid Javed Burki, a former Minister of Finance and World Bank Vice President, argues that, despite early positive signs, the Musharraf Government missed a golden opportunity to put the economy on a new growth path. While the administration’s pro-business orientation unleashed considerable entrepreneurial activity, it was not accompanied by the on-going improvements in governance, economic freedom and financial reform necessary to complete the takeoff and achieve sustained growth and development8. Of particular importance were limited improvements and, in some cases, deterioration in the five key governance areas monitored by the World Bank: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption (Looney R. , Failed to Take off: An Assessment of Pakistan's October 2008 Economic Crisis, 2009).

The claims made by the Musharraf government of regulating weak structures of the economy were a tool of securing legitimacy and political recognition. The lack of concern towards institutional development of as industries, agriculture and the services sector led to the problem created in 2008. The government implemented popular strategy and along with certain tenants of liberalization, thus, creating a recipe for disaster. To appease the international financial institutions, the government induced the system of local bodies and grass root democracy. This was complimented by corruption and negligence of various issues of governance. Allowing foreign investment into the country was to secure confidence from international donors, thus creating short-term strategies (Nazar, Faltering economy, 2008). The government’s economic strategy, together with the underdevelopment of institutional support, created an environment increasingly at odds with high rates of sustained economic growth. While the country was able to attract considerable amounts of more foreign investment, most of these funds went into import activities to satisfy domestic demand, instead of into the export sector. This pattern of investment placed increasing pressure on the balance of payments, making the country very vulnerable to external shocks and reductions in external capital flows (Amjad, 2007). In addition, the Musharraf administration failed to anticipate the supply bottlenecks, particularly in the areas of electricity and gas, which would inevitably result from a sharp increase in GDP. By 2006-7, energy shortages were forcing many firms to shorten hours and reduce output, and there was mounting concern that the power shortage would affect the productive capacity and export performance of the country. In all fairness to the Musharraf administration, the energy crisis was the result of long-term supply-side neglect. Beginning in the early 1980s, the gap between the consumption and generation of electricity had steadily expanded, but no augmenting measures were initiated. Not until very recently were the country’s problems examined in any sort comprehensive way (Looney R. , The Musharraf Paradox: The Failure of an Economic Success Story, 2008).

Next, the tax base remained narrow and rather inflexible. The Musharraf government failed to realize that major fiscal reforms were needed to pull wide segments of the population out of poverty and, thus, prevent growth from widening income inequalities13. Specifically, the income tax system was not adjusted. As a result, only about 2% of Pakistani population paid direct income tax, while approximately 70% of tax revenue was generated by indirect taxes, which placed most of the tax burden on the poor, the salaried class and the business sector. Not only did the poor pay more than their fair share of taxes, but also they benefitted little from the Musharraf economic expansion. Much of the increase in GDP came from the sectors which returned high rewards to the investors but in which the share of wages was relatively low. Real estate development was one of the important sectors of the economy, as was the modern service sector. Neither, at least in the context of Pakistan, generated employment and income for the poorer segments of the population (Sharif, MacroEcnomic Stability in Pakistan, 2009).

Another area where the Musharraf administration failed to make any progress at reform was the country’s sprawling military industrial complex Milbus[6]. Over the years, Pakistan’s military had expanded its holdings of industries, properties and foundations. These properties guaranteed the armed forces both organizational autonomy and a regular flow of resources from the public and private sectors – often to the enrichment of senior officers, both active-duty and retired. It is estimated that the military controlled 12% of state land, or 11.58 million acres. Much of this land was rented at very low fees to military personnel. The estimated total wealth of this sector may have been as high as $100 billion (Siddiqa, 2007). From an economic perspective, these activities are nothing like the leading industries in rostow’s theory of ‘take off’ and growth. This practice benefitted only a few organization and individuals, virtually being no different than previous democratic governments. Diluting the claims of the Musharraf government of empowering the impoverished. This compromised the economic growth and the economic activities did not have a trickle down affect onto the masses. Instead ‘milbus’ encouraged crony capitalism and inefficiency, placing a tremendous drag on economic expansion. Pakistan’s underinvestment in human capital was another structural problem that had existed almost since independence (Siddiqa, 2007).

Burki argues, in sum, Pakistan’s economic meltdown was precipitated by basic structural problems that have repeatedly interacted to create balance of payments crises. To begin with, Pakistani economy is heavily dependant on imports. The country’s imports always surpass its exports, many of which consist of traditional items of poor quality due to Pakistan’s poor human capital development. Next, Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio is 10%, far below the average 17% of developing countries. Even more telling, less than two percent of the population is covered by the tax net. Thus, the Musharraf government’s huge expenditure on debt servicing, defense and current spending resulted in fiscal deficits that reached 7.4% of GDP by FY2008 (Looney & McNab, Pakistan's Economic and Security Dilemma: Expanded Defence Expenditures and the Relative Governance Syndrome, 2008). Simply put, Musharraf policies made Pakistan dangerously dependent on foreign capital. The country’s political instability and lack of significant progress in governance and economic reforms further increased its vulnerability to a fall-off in foreign capital. By 2007, it found itself in a position where any major reduction in foreign capital inflows would precipitate an economic crisis. In addition to this pre-existing set of structural conditions, specific economic policies pursued under President Pervez Musharraf helped trigger the October 2008 crisis. For Example the high consumption strategy allowed growth, aided by generous aid inflows, rising asset prices and loose monetary policy; this resulted in inflation. A by-product of the high-consumption strategy; resulted in extreme high inflation, which rose steadily after March 2007 to eventually reach 25%. Along with global hike in food and oil prices, essential corrective measures through tighter monetary policy were delayed. The current account deficit widened during the last three years of Musharraf rule, as consumption growth was accompanied by a consistent growth in imports. This deficit was met with stable flows of remittances, aid and portfolio investment, together with strong export performance. However, excessive dependence on foreign capital inflows made the current account highly vulnerable.

These factors contributed to a slowing of growth in 2007. In most countries, the slowing of growth usually does not cause political problems, unless gains from previous growth have been inequitably distributed. Unfortunately, the Musharraf administration’s pro-business policy bias, lack of democratic feedback and authoritarian style of policy-making were also not conducive to equitable growth and broad-based development. While no detailed studies of income distribution are available for the last several years of Musharraf regime, Burki estimates that around 10 million Pakistanis benefitted from the economic growth and restructuring, 25 million would have entered the system had it not been disrupted, and 45 million were completely ignored. Furthermore, he notes that regional inequality emerged from the Musharraf era, whose economic benefits were largely confined to the central and northern Punjab and large cities, such as Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Faisalabad and Gujranwala. The ‘failed take-off school’ contends that Pakistan’s political history suggests, economic developments can create great political instability (A.A, 1987). For example, there was a widespread perception that the benefits of the extraordinary economic expansion that occurred under President Ayub Khan in the 1960s went to a very limited number of prominent families (Licht). The authoritarian growth model that developed during this time created such a wide disparity of income between East and West Pakistan that it eventually resulted in the break up of the country. Similar, although less dramatic, changes took place in the late 1980s at the end of the Zia authoritarian era. In both these examples, the aggrieved resorted to violence to achieve their goals (Looney R. , Trends, 2008).

[2] Influence and reliance on foreign aid

[3] Newton is used as a symbol for that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of production.

[4] The argument remains contentious. In the following paragraphs, his failures to implement the strategies and claims under his regime will be evaluated.

[5] Former banker at Citicorp and World Bank, who initially was hired as an advisor on finance, but later on, was elected as the Prime Minister under the Musharraf Government. He has been accredited with most economic policies and re-negotiations of debts under the eight years of rule.

[6] Milbus refers to ‘military business’. A term coined by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa in her book Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy.

General Musharraf coming to power: a mixture of domestic and external influence on Pakistan’s economy

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Domestic policies and structural improvement strategies:

General Pervez Musharraf assumed power in October 1999 and with his cabinet quickly realized the main economic conditions of Pakistan and focused his cabinet’s resources on stabilizing and sustaining the economy. As mentioned in the previous section the foreign debt stood at $38 million. The military government formulated a debt management strategy, which had the various features including, seeking debt relief from lenders and using the savings solely for poverty reduction programs, reserving privatization proceeds exclusively for retirement of public debt, reducing the cost of borrowing through lowering of the interest rates on government schemes, gradually eliminating all borrowings for non-development expenditures, privatizing public sector corporations in the oil and gas sector to achieve greater efficiency, provide for investment resources, and generate funds for debt retirement, constituting a high level debt management committee, under the chairmanship of an expert, with the governor of the State Bank and other senior government officials as members, to suggest measures for establishment of an efficient debt management system and for reducing the debt servicing burden, increasing the flow of remittances through official channels and relying on non-debt creating inflows. This section discusses these steps and how the economic policies were followed through (Husain, Economy of Pakistan: An Overview, 2005).

The economic team of the new government in managing the crisis devoted the initial period and making sure that the country avoided default on the international debt. A comprehensive program of reform was designed and implemented with vigor and pursued in earnest, so as to put the economy on the path of recovery and revival. The military government did not face the same constraints and compulsions as the politically elected governments. It was therefore better suited to take unpopular decisions such as imposing general sales tax, raising prices of petroleum, utilities and removing subsidies so badly needed to bring about fiscal discipline and reduce the debt burden. The IMF and the World Bank were invited to enter into negotiations on new stand-by and structural adjustment programs (Easterly, 2001).

The government of General Pervez Musharraf made poverty alleviation one of its top priorities, a platform it supported by the allocation of more resources for poverty reduction. The first pillar of this strategy is macroeconomic stabilization and resumption of economic growth. The second pillar of strategy was improved governance. The government especially emphasized on the accountability, transparency, and predictability in decision-making process. The government introduced a political devolution plan whereby administrative, functional, and financial responsibilities for the delivery of social services are delegated to district governments. Structural reforms constituted as the third pillar of the poverty alleviation strategy. Broad based reforms in tax administration, trade liberalization, and the financial sector form the core. In tax administration, the Central Board of Revenue was restructured, while the tax base was widened. Trade liberalization resulted in tariff rationalization, removal of various restrictions on exports and imports, and deregulation. Financial sector reforms have already resulted in a sound and healthy banking system, a buoyant stock market, a growing corporate debt market, and the strengthening of regulation and supervision (Husain, Economy of Pakistan: An Overview, 2005).

Although the canvas of reform in Pakistan was vast and corrective action required on a number of fronts, there was a conscious effort to focus on achieving macroeconomic stability, on certain key priority structural reforms and improving economic governance. The structural reforms included privatization, financial sector restructuring, trade liberalization, picking up pace towards deregulation of the economy and generally moving towards a market-led economic regime (Hussain I. , 2004).

General Musharraf implemented a wide range of structural reforms, including: Restructuring and right-sizing of the civil services, rationalization of pay and pensions finalized, increased autonomy granted to Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), strong focus on training and improved procedures for performance assessment, devolution of political power to the grassroots level, judicial reforms, police reforms, national anti-corruption strategy, freedom of information act promulgated and Pakistan Public Procurement Authority established.

These measures specify that all existing tax exemptions were to be withdrawn in the June 2000 budget. The tax was to be simplified by stressing transparent and voluntary self-assessment schemes. A retail General Sales Tax (GST) and agriculture income tax were to be imposed. Foreign exchange remittances of profit, dividends, and royalties were once again to be allowed without prior permission of the State Bank of Pakistan. Central excise duty was withdrawn on credit card and other business transactions. Only foreigners were to be allowed to open foreign exchange deposit accounts in local banks in an effort to assist the immunities available to government bondholders were withdrawn in order to stop money laundering. Tax rates on government securities and bonds were cut. Pakistan’s Euro-bond debt was successfully rescheduled (Cheema, May 2004).

Table 1.2: Foreign Investment[2]

Year	Foreign Investment (US $ million)
1995–96	1307
1996–97	950
1997–98	823
1998–99	403
1999–2000	543
2000–01	182
2001–02	475
2002–03	1000

In 2001, the government took two important measures in the area of foreign trade. These measures were to explore different markets and diversify trade and, secondly, to reduce imports. Pakistan improved its trade ties with different countries. Other than the UAE and Saudi Arabia, all other countries are referred to as non- traditional markets in the context of Pakistan’s previous export patterns. Furthermore, efforts were made to improve trade relations with Kenya, Nigeria, and Syria.

In addition, government provided few incentives to Exporters who posted at least a ten percent growth over the prior year’s exports were allowed to retain 50 percent of the additional exports in their local foreign currency account. They could use this amount for the purchase of machinery, equipment, raw materials, and payment of commissions and promotional expenses. Export development charges were waived on additional exports. Exporters who demonstrated better performance were given monetary rewards. An “incentive scheme” that sought to reward three categories of exporters (large, medium, and small) for increases in overall exports, entering new markets, value addition, etc., was devised. An amount of PRs. 2 billion was allocated for this project.

9/11 and Pakistan’s role as the frontline state:

September the 11^th 2001 marked the shift in global paradigm. The attack on the World Trade Center in New York left policy makers revisiting their foreign policy doctrines. Pakistan once again fell at a geo-strategic location and its importance re-surged. It became as what was termed as a front line ally state, in the war against terror, with the then General Musharraf surrendering to the US demands. The American administration was promised use of Pakistani airspace and access to military bases. The Pakistan army would provide security and logistical support to the US army during the campaign against Afghanistan. Pakistan would also secure their western border with Afghanistan in order to confine the Taliban fighters, and allow access to Pakistani intelligence assets (Harber,p3). This section highlights the role of Pakistan on the war on terror and the implications of going to war with the United States of America and her western allies against terrorism. Hence the section aids in understanding how Pakistan came to argue and lobby her case through to external financing as she did in the Russia-Afghan war (Harrison, May-2007).

Pakistan’s status as a “front line-state” in war against terror has greatly affected the country in many ways. First, the slower pace of economic activity in Pakistan’s major trading partner countries (the United States and European Union, in particular) reduced their demands for Pakistani products, also, increases in freight rates and imposition of war risk insurance increased the cost of imports and made Pakistani exports more expensive. Second, cancellation of air cargo flights by foreign airlines disrupted the trade flows. Third, manufacturing units had to maintain higher inventories because of the risk of instability. Fourth, the departure of expatriates from the country and the suspension of visits by foreign buyers did not allow the country to maintain normal trade relations, also, revenue collection also suffered due to lower imports, while the continuous influx of Afghan refugees placed further pressure on Pakistan. The terrorist attack on the Indian parliament and subsequent troop deployments on the international border between India and Pakistan had also affected foreign investment and the trade balance of Pakistan (Cheema, May 2004).

Just few days after the attack, Pakistan incurred a loss of $1.8 billion, as exports had declined and loss of business optimism. Insurance companies had imposed war risk surcharge on all trade to and from Pakistani ports. Hotel and travel industry faced a severe loss of foreign airlines and travelers cancelling, due to terrorist threat. Moreover, the long-term impact on the economy was even more devastating as global branding of Pakistan as unstable state deterred foreign investors (Chawla, Developments in Pakistan Economy Post-September 11,2001, 2002).

Like previous experiences Pakistan saw opportunity and used the external influence to overcome domestic short falls. Pakistan lobbied to renew the decade long suspended aid from United States and other financial institutions. Lifting of sanctions and renewed aid program from the World Bank promoted positive reforms within the economy. Simultaneously, the Paris Club[5] creditors agreed to restructure the public debt and negotiate bilaterally with each creditor country. The European union thus, allowed wider market access and tariffs imposed on Pakistani export goods were removed (Chawla, Developments in Pakistan Economy Post-September 11,2001, 2002, p246).

[1] Source: Ashfaque Hasan Khan, “Economic Performance during 1999–2002,” Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, http://www.finance.gov.pk/summary/99_2002.pdf, 9.

[2] Source: Ashfaque Hasan Khan, “Economic Performance during 1999–2002,” Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, http://www.finance.gov.pk/summary/99_2002.pdf, 24.

[3] Source: Ashfaque Hasan Khan, “Economic Performance during 1999–2002,” Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, http://www.finance.gov.pk/summary/99_2002.pdf, 23. See also State Bank of Pakistan, Economic Data, http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/eimports.pdf.

, University of Sindh, at Karachi on August 12, 2003,

http://www.sbp.org.pk/about/speech/2004/eco_of_pk(past_present_future).pdf.

[5] Zaidi, S. A. (2005). Issues in Pakistan's Economy (2nd edition and revised ed.). Oxford: OUP,p367, box16.5.

Pakistan’s economy on the eve of the military coup in 1999

2009-12-04T00:28:00.000Z

Since its inception on 14^th august, 1947, Pakistan has faced institutional and structural transformations on several fronts. Whether political, social or economic, Pakistan has been unable to draw a national reconciliation policy and has lacked the vision to develop itself in various directions. This part of the paper briefly highlights the events in Pakistan’s economic leading up to Musharraf’s regime of economic stability. This section of the paper is vital in understanding the various structurally embedded issues faced by the economy before Musharraf came to power and emphasizes the development plan put in place by his government (Talbot, 2004).

Pakistan has faced many martial laws enforcements, and economically and socially devastating civil war that resulted in the separation of East Pakistan to Bangladesh. The impacts of the changes in political regimes lead to devastation in economic growth and development. Pakistan only witnessed economic growth with very small changes in infrastructure and development structures under the dictatorial regimes; as many of the democratic establishments were unable to finish their elected terms.

Under the presidency of General Zia Ul Haq, Pakistan was the biggest beneficiary of aid from the United States of America (Ali B. , 1987). However, after the death of president, the constitution was restored and the democratic setup was back on track.

The country slacked in the 1990s and began to slip in growth, exports, revenues, and development spending and got entrapped into external and domestic indebtedness. This was due to both fundamental structural and institutional problems as well as to poor governance and frequent changes in political regimes. With short life spans, succeeding governments were hesitant, if not outright unwilling to take tough and unpopular economic decisions to set the economy right (Hussain I. , 2004). Moreover, the average lifespan of two to three years was clearly inadequate for implementing meaningful policy or institutional changes. At the start of the second term of the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan was on the verge of a financial default largely, due its foreign debt of over $39 billion (Looney R. E., 2001,p219). The macro economic indicators reflected poor growth as the manufacturing sector had contracted at the same time as the agricutural sector was suffering. Paksitan’s performance on the arena of international trade had also suffered, leading to an increase in the balance of payment deficit.

Similarly, the Sharif government was unable to make any improvements in curbing the ‘black’ economy[1], instead he announced tax cuts in order to benefit the industrialist lobby (Looney R. E., 2001,p220). The external environment had also become unfavorable after the event of May 1998, when Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test (Zaidi A. , occasional paper, 2004,p6). The aftermath of this test led to further economic isolation of Pakistan and a considerable erosion of confidence by domestic and non-resident Pakistanis. Economic sanctions were imposed against Pakistan by the western governments. Aid programs from Japan and IMF had been suspended in the wake of the nuclear test conducted by Pakistan in may of 1998. Moreover, according to a report issued by the State Bank of Pakistan the same year, balance of payment net foreign assets and exchange rate were heavily affected. The stock market and crashed and the foreign reserves depleted at a growing rate. The government[2] at the time responded by imposing a freeze on the flight of foreign reserve, leading to further destruction of investor confidence (Zaidi A. , occasional paper, 2004,p7).

By the late 1990s Pakistan had entered almost a critical state of paralysis and stagnation in its economy particularly on the international front. It is important to note some of the very significant changes in the economy summarized below:

· Drastically large drop in workers’ remittances

· The continuous decline in export growth, eventually leading to a negative

· IMF program and World Bank assistance were suspended and the bilateral donors had terminated their aid

· At the same time the debt payments due were in far excess of the liquid foreign exchange resources the country possessed.

· Pakistan was almost at the brink of default on its external payments

· Economic growth was anemic and the debt ratios were alarmingly high

· Incidence of poverty had once again risen to 32 percent[3]

All in all, Pakistan was on the road to economic devastation without any hope or light of recovery.

· Role of International Financial Institutions:

The IMF, directly and indirectly, has played a crucial role in the macroeconomic stability of Pakistan since 1988. It has provided direct bilateral support to Pakistan in order to cope with its macroeconomic imbalances. Indirectly, the IMF has influence on lending by other donor agencies. This is evident from the fact that whenever Pakistan enjoyed good relations with the IMF, other lending agencies also provided money to Pakistan and vice versa. The IMF credit rating of a borrowing country is taken very seriously by other donor agencies (Khan A. A., Role of Institutions in Economic Development, 2008). The IMF also influences policies of lending countries to a great extent. According to Dr. Ishrat Husain:

The IMF enjoys excessive concentration of power and has a virtual monopoly of knowledge and ideas in prescribing as to what are the right policies a country ought to follow. It has disproportionately large influence on financing provided by other players—development banks, fund managers, debt relief by Paris and London Clubs and syndicate lending by commercial banks…A negative assessment by the IMF or even a failure to complete on time places the reputational capital of the borrowing country at great risk, erodes its credibility in the financial markets and reduces financial flows into the country. There are instances where this created a snowball effect amplifying the disequilibrium in macroeconomic balances as the IMF and other financiers collectively withheld their assistance.[4]

Since 1988, Pakistan has not enjoyed smooth relations with the IMF, because of the latter’s dissatisfaction with the economic performance of Pakistan. Pakistan signed several agreements with the IMF, but due to a variety of factors most of them remained incomplete, with the IMF refusing to lend the full amounts to Pakistan. It must be remembered that in the 1990s, the nation suffered many losses on the economic front and the era is thus considered a “lost decade” for the economy of Pakistan. All macroeconomic indicators showed poor performance, bringing Pakistan to the brink of default. Moreover, the IMF’s relations with Pakistan were further strained by 1997 due to the policies of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Large-scale corruption by her People’s Party and its resistance to structural reforms irritated the IMF and World Bank (Zaidi S. A., 2005).

The World Bank also supports reforms initiated by the Government to improve its effectiveness at federal, provincial, and district levels. The Project to Improve Financial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA) enabled the government to develop a new accounting model, which consisted of revised forms, principles, and methods of accounting and financial reporting to establish an integrated financial management system in Pakistan. The PIFRA project also provided for the introduction of a double entry computerized General Ledger System for all government financial transactions in a phased manner. The basic purpose of this system was to make government bookkeeping more effective and efficient, reducing opportunities for corruption.

[1] Black economy refers to the economy where commerce and economic activity is conducted without the umbrella of rules and regualations..

[2] General Musharraf toppled the democratically elected government under the then Prime minister Nawaz Sharif, in the successive year. One of the reasons for the military takeover was the mismanagement of the economy and freezing the foreign reserve.

[3] These statistics have been taken from a number of various resources and the most significant of all being Economy of Pakistan: An Overview by Hussian (2005).

[4] source: Ishrat Husain, “Economy of Pakistan: Past, Present and Future,” a paper presented at the seminar on Pakistan Ideology held by Pakistan Study Center

WTO and South Asia: A review of Pakistan’s trade policy.

2009-12-04T00:18:00.002Z

The twentieth century unfolded by presenting many global orders and events. The highlights were the two world wars, which led to the reshuffle of global power politics. Many believe the world wars of Europe were fought on military gains, but the underlying reason of trade politics and economic superiority cannot be negated. After the end of the Second World War, global powers created and implemented the Breton woods system. This move was to balance out the disparity between nations and open avenues for cooperation and global integration. The Breton woods agreement paved way for liberal institutions such as the World Bank and the international monetary fund. Global powers of the time found it imperative to promote liberalism in order to stabilize and harmonize the global order. Subsequently, the economic crisis of the 70’s pushed developing economies to allow intervention and acquire stabilization and structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The reforms included state’s role in the economy, lowering trade barriers to imports and removing restrictions on foreign direct investments. Moreover, it also pushed forward elimination of subsidies given to local industries, devaluation of currency and promotion of export. Such policies underlined the western hegemony and injected capitalistic morals into transitional economies. On the bright side economic integration, open economies and rising globalization were becoming the norm.

The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was conceived in 1948, aimed at regulating and facilitating international trade. It was to reduce trade barriers and work towards a global trade expansion. However, for half a century the GATT systematically and successively disappointed and undermined the status of the developing and least developed countries in the world. The many structural and economic adjustments programs did not act in the benefit of the developing world and in turn created chaos (Mujhaid, 2002, p5). It delivered the wishes of powerful players i.e. United States of America, Western Europe and Japan onto the growing economies, eventually creating resentment amongst the weaker nations. Evident examples of the Kennedy Round of 1963 and the Tokyo Round of 1973-79 enhanced global trade exponentially, but only to the benefit of developed nations. The developed countries prospered on the shoulders of the developing countries, and similarly the platform for developing economies to negotiate did not exist. The poorer countries therefore did not have the money to compete fiercely in the international market, and secondly the subsidies provided by developed nations did not allow their product to compete internationally, thus making the poor poorer. Issues of development and economic disparity remained contentious and prevented the developing countries to reap many benefits.

The unprecedented economic growth of the late 80’s and 90’s pushed forward the inception of the World Trade Organization. The Uruguay round of 1984, which was concluded in 1995 at Marrakesh and promised a global mechanism to ensure economic integration and growth; at the same time acknowledging the plight of developing nations. This was to cover commercial activity and trade policy, with a constitutional and legal framework working towards a liberal trading order. The objectives were simple and concise, as they provided a fair and just competitive trading system with objectives to raise global standard of living, ensuring employment, and expanding the production and exchange of goods (Mujhaid, 2002, p7). The rules of the game set in the WTO revolves around a few important principles. The first and foremost priciple, which acts as the backbone of the organisation is to ensure a non-discriminatory policy by a member country towards all other member countries. For example, the ‘most favored nation’ status is accorded equally to all members. If a country allows trade in certain areas to another country, it has to allow the same treatment to all other members. This is one of the crucial factors why the case study of Pakistan was chosen, as later in the essay it will be discovered how Pakistan has responded to this condition. Also a ‘national treatment’ is to be provided by treating the imported good along with the local. This is aimed at eliminating non-tarriff barriers to trade such as techinical standards. Moreover, the need to conduct reciprocity is crucial as ‘free riding’ and obtaining better access to foreign markets is contained. The gain for both the partners in trade needs to be in porportion in order to secure steady prosperity (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001, p50).

The WTO also ensures the binding and enforcement of commitments made by member countries at the time of joining the organization. It is perhaps a vital part that allows countries enumerating a list of concessions, and if changes are made later on, then the defendant country is to compensate any loss of trade. The organization has a distinct feature of enforcing transparency through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Member countries are required to publish their trade regulations and allow other members to access information. The WTO then facilitates these reports by conducting a country specific review, improving predictability and stability in the trading order. The key task in the TPRM’s is to discourage quotas and push forward a conducive environment for market access (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001, p61). The WTO entails a dispute settlement mechanism, which has acted for the benefit of many developing countries. The rules and procedures of the organization have set aside special provisions for developing and least developed countries, safeguarding their interests (Yerxa & Wilson, 2005).

The above-mentioned principles of the WTO are just and equal, as well as in line with the propagated values of the World Bank, and the IMF. The question is not to have global trade rules but what kind of rules to have. As perceived by the developing and least developed nations, the underling benefit of such organizations lies with the US, EU, and the Paris and London club members. Developing countries see this as threat to their economic sovereignty, by allowing privatization and foreign access. Invariably, the capitalistic principles let the market forces prevail which therefore results in MNC’s entering into foreign markets and the systematic pilfering of national wealth. The role of WTO is heavily criticized, as it is perceived as being a Breton wood protégé (Mujhaid, 2002, p12). Similarly, the transfer of technology and technological know how has primarily remained with the West, treating the developing countries merely as suppliers and potential markets. An ideal example would be of the American agriculture sector, which is heavily guarded by farm subsidies, tariff walls and loan guarantees, therefore, the developing nations are at odds with the situation and have great difficulties in exporting. This is also the case with regard to the European Union’s Common Agriculture Policy, where large amount of subsidies were given to products such as rice, sugar etc, where the developing countries have a comparative advantage (Burki, 2006, p2). These policies however, have a very important consequence. They hurt the livelihood and produce of workers all over the developing world, which results in many grievances.

Phyto-sanitary regulations and other non- tariff barriers were the common method of denying products from the developing world. The resentment was seen at the debacle of the Seattle ministerial, paving the way for the inclusion of the developing world into global trade negotiations. This led to the ministerial of 2001 at Doha where the American administration highlighted the need to address the continuing slow growth, persistent poverty and deteriorating income distribution in the developing world. In the backdrop was the catastrophic event of 9/11, which allowed the world to turn towards the developing countries, especially of Muslim majority and resolve their plight. The hidden reason for such a move was backed by the liberal economic theory, and past experiences of providing aid to developing countries for development was seen as a failure. The west believed that investing through trade and commercial activities would alleviate development issues and corrupt intermediaries could be bypassed (Burki, 2006, p3).

Also in the underlying agenda of the Doha Development round was the need to address the millennium goals of the United Nations. The World Bank estimated the by 2015 320 million people would be living above $2 dollars a day, if trade barriers and subsidies would be eliminated from the system. The expansion in freer trade would not just benefit the poorer nations but also curtail growing socio-economic problems, which in turn were affecting the global politics (Burki, 2006). The power structure post the turn of the millennium saw a change in actors, from the traditional G8 to the growing economies of Brazil, India, China and Russia. The globalization wave was taking its toll and after half a decade various regions and countries started to cement their importance in the global arena. China could no longer be classified as a developing country, as it fell out of the category and was in fact just short of being a super power. The decline of American hegemony and growing regionalism allowed for many groups to bargain collectively in these supra-national organizations. Another example of India could be considered, as it was the most advanced amongst its regional competitors and became actively involved in acquiring a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, after declaring herself as a nuclear state.

The Doha rounds witnessed a formation of alliances of nations geared towards attaining their desired goals. Amongst many were the EU, the Cairns Group, the G20 and the African bloc. Unfortunately, South Asia has not been seen as a collective negotiating bloc; a fact due in no small part to the historical acrimony that exists between the nations of the subcontinent. One of the themes of the essay aims to address the role of South Asia in the WTO and the players within it. South Asia bears one sixth of the world population and is also the battleground for two traditional arch rivals- India and Pakistan. There is tethered co-operation under the heading of SAARC, which aims at collecting and addressing regional interests. However, the interaction of the bloc collectively with other global actors has been seldom due to political differences (Kelegama & Mukherji, 2003, p3864). South Asian economies started their economic liberalization drive from the 80’s, mostly due to interference and pressure from the IMF and the World Bank. Sri Lanka was the first to open its market and then followed Pakistan, then Bangladesh and finally India (Majd, 1995). Foreign trade was of high importance to this region due to its strong agriculture base; therefore, it pushed these countries to bring down their tariffs and restrictions. Along with openness towards foreign investment, South Asian countries extensively began trading with the west and other regional blocs, allowing them global interaction and lobbying. At this stage all seven countries within south Asia are members of the WTO. However, they are perceived or grouped in different categories. WTO’s failure to conclude the Doha rounds of 2001 and the inability of the developed countries to eliminate the distortions existing in the world trading system have caused many developing countries to form powerful alliances in order to obtain their desired goals. Some of the groups have joined hands in fighting for a fair trading system, and resist western exploitation (Kelegama & Mukherji, 2003). Similarly, in respect to the South Asian case, the USA has exerted pressure in preventing a formation of a regional bloc. The vital interests of USA in the region remain the major priority and therefore a joint stand on a number of issues would push back US interference. The USA and EU through preferential free trade agreements; especially with Pakistan, have systematically eliminated chances of co-operation within the region. Also through threats of withdrawing concessions not covered under the WTO manifesto has helped them further deter nations from the formation of a South Asian bloc.

Moreover, Indian policy makers are of the view that since India is an emerging economy and is at a higher growth rate than others in the region, it has conveniently distanced itself. India gives more weight-age to issue based coalitions than a constant common position, hence maintaining its superiority. However, the fact remains that India’s socio economic indicators have been at par with other regional countries, a fact that proves to be contrary to her aspirations.

The first and second consultative meeting of the SAARC commerce secretaries on WTO issue was held in 1999 where various issues regarding the trading system were discussed. The most important perhaps was the issue of greater access to the markets of developed countries in the sectors of textiles and clothing. With regards to TRIPS and TRIMS the commerce ministers of the region sought an extension and delay on the applicability of the non-violation clause. A substantial and unprecedented step was taken by preparing a joint statement to be presented at the Seattle round of the WTO (Kelegama & Mukherji, 2003). Similarly the ministers of SAARC countries issued a statement in 2001 to reiterate their commitment towards resolving the plea of the developing nations at the Doha rounds of negotiations. The ministers strongly felt the growing development deficit should be addressed and that sustainable global economic growth can only be achieved through providing fair and just opportunities to the developing nations. Also, the need to facilitate the comparative advantage of such countries is vital along with the elimination of unreasonable protectionist measures (Kelegama & Mukherji, 2003). However the fate of such co-operation fell apart due to regional conflict and politics of India and Pakistan. This highlighted the inefficiency of the region to combine and collectively demand for a common benefit. The primary reason for this failure is that Pakistan has not granted India MFN Status on various products. Secondly, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are classified as developing nations by economic standards, whereas, Bangladesh Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives are amongst the least developed nations. The prioritization of different issues and problems makes way for an incoherent and disunited stance. To create a common stance is fairly difficult, as the issues of least developed nations, for example, would revolve around special and differential treatment. Whereas the developing nations would want better market access and reciprocity from the developed world.

Another factor, which has disrupted the effort to form a bloc, has been departure on various issues, and the signing of bilateral trade agreements with developed countries, particularly the USA. For example Sri Lanka depends heavily on garments exports to the US and has therefore signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement to secure bilateral trade ties. And lastly, the failure to conclude the Doha round of negotiations has left the countries in the region skeptical of the WTO’s role, and prefer either directly interacting with the developed world or through other influential groups (Kelegama & Mukherji, 2003).

Coming to the case of Pakistan, firstly, its economy and dynamics need to be understood in order to distinguish its role in the WTO and the impact of WTO on its trade policy. Pakistan has been in a transitional stage for a while due to political instability and autocratic rule. After its creation in 1947, Pakistan quickly aligned itself with United States of America and benefitted from the aid, which flowed in as a result of such an alliance. By the 70’s it went through major political turmoil and civil unrest resulting in a nationalistic and partly socialist regime coming forward and bringing a wave of nationalization and protectionism. This policy carried on for a decade when a coup in the country with the cold war at its all time high saw a thinly veiled US intervention and an acceptance of the importance of Pakistan in western political circles. Pakistan began liberalizing its economy in the 80’s and allowed an influx of foreign companies and investment (Ali B. , 1987). Due to dictatorial rule and unaccountable governments; sustainable and independent national policies targeting development and growth could not be devised. A near absence of research and development caused by unpredictable external factors in many sectors of the economy stagnated growth; and Pakistan began to walk backwards whilst its neighbors prospered.

The 90’s saw heavy intervention from the World Bank and the IMF; liberalizing and de-regulating Pakistan’s economy, resulting in a devaluing of the currency. Economic growth remained mixed and interesting to note is the fact that the Pakistani economy did not suffer much during the Asian financial crisis; although mostly due to its lack of a coherent globally comparable structure at the time. Due to its geo-strategic presence and the changing global currents, Pakistan has been the centre of attention for over a decade. Surprisingly, it has been on the verge of bankruptcy on more than one occasion and foreign exchange reserves have at times plunged down to a mere few million dollars; however foreign intervention and Western support has time and again bailed out the economy (Mujhaid, 2002). What has been established through its checkered economic history is that national institutions have not been able to develop trade and commerce mechanisms independently. Rather bailouts and geo-strategic and political factors have influenced Pakistan in drafting its policies and therefore economic and trade issues are of a lesser priority on the government agenda. However, worthy to note is the fact that the post 1999 military government facilitated independent and liberal policies initiating a revival of the economy. Tax, trade and tariff reforms along with deregulation and privatization were given priority. Reforms on the financial sector along with foreign direct investment were seen. Also special attention was given to the agriculture and textile sector as they form the backbone of Pakistan’s exports with every year having higher targets to achieve, in order to reduce the deficit in the balance of payments (Maqbool, Impact of WTO on the Economy of Pakistan, 2005). The government on the 18^th of July 2008 announced a $22billion export target reflecting a 13% growth since the previous year; however the trade deficit stood at $20.7 billion (Lodhi, 2008).

As Pakistan has embarked upon the economic correction scheme under the IMF and World Bank’s supervision, it will have to open access to local markets for foreign goods and services. Thus, it will have to provide MFN status to all the trading partners, which implies Pakistan providing MFN status to arch rival India. This could create havoc in the local industry of Pakistan, as for example, the country’s total GDP is $60 billion, and if India subsidizes all of its imports; Pakistan would feel the effects on its own market. If the battle is fought through the WTO then the tariffs are negotiable, due to the IMF’s structural adjustment program Pakistan has reduced tariffs from 65% to 30%, gradually (Mujhaid, 2002). Similarly, in the case of a dispute, if Pakistan would challenge through the dispute settlement body of the WTO, it would not have ample resources to pay heavy foreign exchange to international lawyers. A case in light would be of the ‘Basmati’ rice, which was won by India against the US and therefore, Pakistani exporters are prohibited to use the patent unless they provide a heavy royalty to India (Mujhaid, 2002); a case that if compared to a hypothetical European scenario would mean that the producers of Champagne in France would lose the right to call their sparkling wine champagne due to their financial inability to stop the English from claiming the title in the International arena.

To further understand Pakistan’s trade policy and revisit the implications of WTO on Pakistan’s economy, it is necessary to look at the country’s stance at the Doha rounds in 2001. Pakistan departed from supporting the status quo and maintained its ambitious resolve towards the agricultural sector. To achieve results it joined the G-20 coalition and the Cairns Group as their members share the same objectives. Moreover, it associated itself with the G-33 to be able to use a ‘special safeguard mechanism’ against dumping and self designated special products (Butt & Bandara, 2008,p282). Their strategy in the export was to complete the elimination of subsidies by 2013; and a substantial reduction on tariffs to allow market access. The highlight of the Doha rounds was the NAMA (non agricultural market access) negotiations, in which Pakistan proposed the Swiss formula [1]. Pakistan’s key objective was to get tariff peaks of the developed countries eliminated as they were hurting the textile and clothing sector. Many countries were receiving preferential tariff treatment by USA and EU, in which Pakistan was not included (Butt & Bandara, 2008,p278). As a developing country they were seeking some flexibility to keep their sensitive sectors unbound. In the case of GATS Pakistan actively took part in the agreed mechanism of pluri-lateral negotiations, and sponsored a request for market access. Domestically they supported transparency of regulations and a balance between regulatory autonomy and excessive regulations. Pakistan also requested for special and differential treatment in the form of a longer implementation period with technical assistance. Trade facilitation was seen as important and a balance between facilitating trade without compromising collection of revenues and other border controls. It also pursued the developed countries to provide technical assistance in order to enhance implementation capacity (Butt & Bandara, 2008). On the development side Pakistan resented the Canadian decision to give preferential duty free access to LDC’s textile products, resulting in adverse impacts on the Pakistani market. It maintained that the duty free access to LDC’s should not affect the interests of developing nations. This was one of the disagreements during the SAARC conference of commerce secretaries (Mukherji, 2004). Pakistan was part of the ‘Friends of anti dumping’ negotiations and actively propagated its interests.

During the Hong Kong ministerial conference of the WTO, Pakistan did not go with a great deal of hope, as much progress was not made from the Doha development round. The then commerce minister was the negotiator on behalf of the G-20, fighting the case of non- agriculture market access. Another problem, which Pakistan faced, was due to the lack of progress made after the Doha development rounds, the developed world was ready to provide duty free imports of textile from LDC’s in order to temporarily satisfy them. However the developing and newly industrialized nations were to be taxed heavily, leaving Pakistan at a disadvantage. The textile sector negotiation was seen as the most vital part of the Hong Kong summit, thus, Pakistan was unprepared and unconcerned regarding other issues at the WTO, which resulted in a disappointment. The only forecasted benefit from the Hong Kong round was that developed countries, through a gradual process, promised agriculture subsidies elimination. On the concession of cotton subsidies, Pakistan was left out as only the African states along with the LDC’s benefitted. Another thorn in the relationship of Pakistan with other LDC’s (including countries in South Asia) was its activism towards jeopardizing their duty free export of textile lines (Burki, 2006). Pakistan’s approach towards reaping benefits from the WTO has been fairly marginal, as it could only extract advantages for agricultural trade in negotiations. Moreover, its protectionist policies towards its services sector have not helped much in achieving benefits from global trade.

In its latest bid to expand the export base, the present government has recognized problems and considered restructuring, by removing bureaucratic bottlenecks and establishing a trade dispute mechanism. The new strategy will entail improving infrastructure and building capacity instead of providing subsidies. On the international front, Pakistan now sees the regional players as a potential market and predicts growth in the region. Moves such as the South Asian Free Trade Agreement and the Regional Agreement on Trade in Services will prove beneficial in the future (Lodhi, 2008). The ‘Look East’ foreign policy of Pakistan has enabled it to take bold decisions and allowed Indian investors in the CNG (compressed natural gas) sector of Pakistan. Making the total figure of items that can be imported from India rise to 1,938, whereas the Indian government has allowed the permission of import of over 8,000 items from Pakistan. Official trade between two countries has increased to $2 billion whereas unofficial channels reveal a much higher figure. The bone of contention in Pakistan’s trade policy has been the flooding of local markets by cheap Indian products. At the moment Pakistani markets are filled with Chinese products, and it is perhaps more efficient to allow full import from India which will lower logistical costs. However, the issue remains political, not economical. Economic pundits see opportunity in allowing Indian products as then the country could focus on other sectors and gain comparative advantage. However, national sentiments push forward a protectionist approach within the government circles of the country (South Asia Trade and Investment Network, July 2008). In recent development Islamabad has invited three major Indian companies, namely Tata, Reliance, and Essar to become potential investors in a power project. The country is currently facing an acute power crisis and would greatly benefit from this regional integration. By engaging in private-sector joint ventures future trade prospects for the two countries and the region could become viable (Lodhi, 2008).

In light of the discussion on the WTO, South Asia and Pakistan’s trade policy, one can now clearly assess the global situation and the role of developing and least developed countries, with the focus on South Asia. This essay highlighted the macro picture of the global scenario and how the current trading system evolved. Then moving on towards the developing and the least developed nations and how they suffered the most at the behest of the developed and powerful nations. The politics of international trade clearly highlight the distinction between the haves and the have not’s. This essay depicted the underlying theme that countries, which industrialized before the Second World War, are in command of the current trading system. However, the newly born nations are still struggling to achieve sustainability, which the current wave of globalization is working to their disadvantage.

“Globalisation is no longer an option, it is a fact. Developing countries have to either learn to manage it far more skillfully, or simply drown in the global cross currents” Dr Mahbub Ul Haq[2]

The majority of the developing and least developed countries are facing political crisis, and, those that remain free from such trouble are struggling to make an impact on the global stage or waiting for the current hegemonic rulers to retire or phase out. Relating back to the scenario of South Asia, the formation of a regional bloc is still a far cry from what is currently the scenario. The disparity and disagreements amongst the nations lead them to choose trade partners from outside the region. Aided with political turbulence and conflict; the region has failed to form an effective economic bloc. Moreover the issue of the WTO has been contentious since its inception. On paper it has manifested the correct virtues of a cohesive, just and equal global trading order, but in spirit it has yet to achieve it. The ineffectiveness of the organization to conclude the Doha development round has led to the inevitable conclusion, that in the new millennium the cruel laws of society will still apply to nations, the rich will get richer whilst the poor simply stay poor.

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Butt, M. S., & Bandara, S. J. (2008). National and Regional Impacts of Increasing Non-Agricultural Market Access by Developing Countries- the Case of Pakistan. Economic Analysis & Policy , 38 (2), 277-311.

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[1] Butt, M. S., & Bandara, S. J. (2008). National and Regional Impacts of Increasing Non-Agricultural Market Access by Developing Countries- the Case of Pakistan. Economic Analysis & Policy , 38 (2), p281, box 1.

[2] Mujhaid, Y. H. (2002, june 2). Retrieved may 2, 2009, from PakistanEconomist.com: www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue2002/issue20-21/features3.htm

What is meant by Islamic Constitutionalism

2009-12-01T00:06:00.000Z

The paper shall discover constitutionalism, viewing through the Islamic principles of governance. Firstly, it is vital to understand and decipher the Islamic notion of governance and take into account the historical evidence. One would have to familiarise itself with many Islamic beliefs and concepts, unknown to the western style of governance. Secondly, parallels will be drawn with western models of governance and of Muslims states amalgamating the Islamic notion of constitutionalism with localised culture. Constitutionalism is a notion which has been debated over years, and yet scholars have been unable to define its scope. In the most simplistic of terms the word constitutionalism perhaps, tries to address the spirit and the working of the constitution. However, it moves forward from deriving a legal meaning and attempts to highlight the sociological needs or the social contract. Extracting the literal meaning from the word ‘constitutionalism’, could be used to discover the historical process of constitution making and its development. It can be used as a descriptive tool depicting human behaviour or events leading to the formation of the doctrine. The need for creation of a constitution and the sociological evolution are taken into perspective, while also considering the dynamics of that society in order to understand the process. The second point which constitutionalism tries to address is rather prescriptive or based on the philosophical arguments. From issues of what the state is trying to promote to the inspirations drawn in the process of governance.

The notion allows us to assess the role of constitutionalism with respect to Islam; therefore, it is perhaps important to discuss Islam and its principles in the beginning. Islam being a monotheistic religion puts heavy emphasis on the belief in God (i.e. Allah) and an obligation on the believers to follow his word through the book (i.e. Quran). Furthermore, the word of Allah, descended upon his messenger (i.e. Prophet Muhammad pbuh) and through his practice and advice people understood the essence of the religion. The aim of the religion being in complete servitude of Allah and living in this world according to his wishes and command in order to achieve the ultimate goal in the hereafter. Whatever, required elaboration and explanation from the text of the Quran the Prophet‘s (pbuh) acts would then be observed, understood and recorded. This constituted the Ahadith’s which lays down tools to understand the commandments, moreover, the practices of the Prophet (pbuh) are known as ‘sunnah’ and provides a key source of law.

Yet at the heart of this particular question there rests a fundamental inconsistency. As with other major religions; the focus rests on which Islam you refer to when probing its constitution; for every region seems to have a different ethic, and every society within the religion considers itself closest to Allah. If you probe into what is loosely termed the “orthodox” side of religion, you automatically dive into history, picking up all that was decided fourteen hundred years ago, as many believe the doors of ijtihad are now closed. Yet you find the text too high for understanding, and your research takes you into historians who have painted it with what they consider its true colour. And that is where the problems begin.

Islam is unique in that it finds itself an unadulterated base from which it propagates. There is a uniform holy book, and by and large there are uniform citations of Sunnah. Yet without being strung together by a scholar they make very little sense to a constitutional researcher; or indeed to any form of researcher. And it is here that Islam finds itself a religion infested with inconsistency at its secondary level, the level that insures that all major religions exist in a state akin to the universe before the theorised big bang, a pot of different elements waiting to erupt. A word in the Quran will be deeper in meaning to one, darker in hue to another and comparatively irrelevant to a third.

It is the search for a scholar that splits this question into fragments. The orthodox Saudi-salafi clerics argue that Islam is as literal as literal can be, and so is the Quran. They take an eye for an eye, and consider justice done. The subcontinent and its various self formed religious bodies’ looks towards the teachings of the Caliphs, and at times mitigates before taking that eye, wondering whether there was a valid reason when the first eye was lost. The Iranians follow Shia’ite codes that negate what is broadly propagated as history; toning down the caliphs and considering the words of the Prophet (pbuh) and then Ali (r.a) and his family to be superior. They create a ‘what could have been’ view of the religion, and by and large their practices and their Ayatollah are considered unorthodox by the larger majority of Muslims.

And then there are the few. Those that stand as the most avid advertisement of Islam today, those that highlight wherever violence is stated in the text of religion, delete the peace that exists on either side of it and propagate war. Unending hatred they preach to the masses, and a few from the masses follow in what is currently the most evident and established constitutional structure that boasts itself as Islamic; that of the Taliban. A scholar with an allowance to issue an edict (Fatwa) is considered the statement of Islam in the present day. He or (very rarely) she can decide upon the finer problems that people have with holes that persist in their understanding of religious code in its secondary and tertiary capacity, laying down religion for them and all others that believe.

So when these pinnacle scholars are approached on questions regarding socks, washing machines and megaphones, they can set the code of law for the people from that day forth. They can decide that if you wear a sock thick enough to not let water in, you can wash your feet from over it and not have to take it off when cleansing yourself for prayer. They can decide that washing machines are permitted in Islam because the water does not just go round and round within the barrel[1] but indeed is let out through a funnel at the back, which makes the clothes clean and free from impurity. They can also overturn a ruling of a fellow scholar that bans megaphone use in prayer, on the basis that the megaphone does not portray an echo of the user’s voice, but the voice itself[2].

Muslims scholars whilst stating their opinion on legal matters left the final decision on the reader as the final belief lays down the principle of every man is responsible for his or her decisions and actions. A Muslim may either rely on the word of the scholar or consult with other fellow Muslims; however the responsibility of decisions lies within him. Therefore, there have been differeing practices between many statesman or leaders in interpreting Islam and laying down precedence. Islamic practices have differed in this sense with other religions, as there has been no central clergy or middlemen laying down principles and rules of governance and society. Individuals have taken the responsibility through their own decisions, although scholars and Qadhi’s have provided help with analysing and interpret ting the will of god and his messenger. Furthermore the field of ijtihad is open for all Muslims to learn and devise through either qiyas or ijma and develop on forms of governance.

Understanding and critically evaluating the role of constitutionalism in Islam perhaps requires u to understand the sources of law present in Islam. Firstly, and the most important is the Quran which is the basis of all laws for the ummah. It contains rules and regulations which are explicit ad implicit. The rules regarding belief, worship family commercial and criminal law are extensive and specific to find (al-Hibri, 1992, p. 3). The implicit rules allow more flexibility in implementation and determine rules of behaviour and governance. This provided leeway to mujtahids and different scholars in explaining in accordance to the need of the society. Along with this source is the second most important source i.e. Sunnah. By placing the sunnah second in line does not imply that in times of conflict between the Quran and the sunnah the Quran takes precedence; rather it shows the emphasis of the Quran being the most important document in Muslim administration. Furthermore there are virtually none ahadith’s or practices of the prophet (pbuh) which falls in conflict with the Quran. It is through the sunnah that high importance is laid down on the usage of ijtihad when elaborating on Islamic practices, therefore, opening the gates of several practices in conformity with Islam and in accordance to the current trends of the society.

The liberty to move within the spectrum of law and devise accordingly to this has allowed the process of constitutionalism to acquire flexibility. One of the important features of constitutionalism is to respond to the challenging needs of the society or the era and address the concerns, also highlighting the social contract (Brown, 2002). Islamic jurisprudence allows mujtahids to revisit and revise laws of earlier nature in line with the prevalent circumstances and examining the ayah’s in accordance to the situation. The underlying reasoning is that if a law is based on certain customs which changes, there is room for re-discovery of another clause within the law. Islamic constitutionalism finds itself fairly facilitative in nature as it presumes the doctrine of necessity and allows certain things which have been refused in the past. For example the hanafi school of thought has allowed eating of pork and drinking of alcohol in situations of near death. Islamic law also applies in situations specific to certain facts and therefore, provides room for departure from previous on the pretext of change in dynamics. Moreover, stress is put upon the need of the laws and rules of governance being in conformity with the public interest. Public interest and mood allow development of law and has been influential in shaping practices of different governments. For examples, in the Middle East trading is closed on Friday where as in other Muslim countries practice is line with the western principle of Sunday being the day off work. Both cases form as the classic example of Islamic law responding to public needs.

Islam as a religion has developed gradually and has preferred the method of gradualism. Examples can be taken from the banning of alcohol after several years of the verse being revealed onto the prophet (pbuh). Islamic practices allow gradual growth of idea and believe in an evolutionary change than a revolutionary change in the system. Many scholars debate that matters of public interest and governance should be dealt with consensus and slowly be allowed to form rather than usurp, disrupting the status quo of the society. In other words this argument promotes the use of democratization, which allows participation and development of ideas through a gradual process of debate and discussion. In Islam a concept exist of selecting the leader through consensus, similar to what we see in the modern democratic process? It is called ‘bay’ah’ which refers to the rules and procedures of political succession (al-Hibri, 1992, p. 11). Traditionally this was the process through which caliphs were selected, where a few men would reach a conclusion on a single individual and then offer him to accept the post of the caliph. Then the choice would then be made public to receive the verdict from the people. In modern day constitutionalism, this idea resonates’ the current trends of selecting and forming a government. Where a certain person would be nominated and then faced with the public for their consent. Similar suffrages were provided to people as of today or modern constitutionalism. The right to vote and voice concern have been prevalent in olden Islamic practices as well. However, in modern day dynamics the sheer size of the populations does not allow to choose many wise men and the successively have a vote on each. Moreover, in the historical process the right to remove was never practised as it was not needed. Therefore, in modern day constitutionalism it would imply that a chosen leader would remain in power until his death.

In the process of Islamic constitutionalism, it is vital for the leader of the state to be of a knowledgeable and religious mind. However, the concept of nation-state did not come about till the end of the caliphate, but the leader of the state should posses a degree of piety and wisdom. Also there is room for having a council of learned men and mujtahids aiding the leader, or what in modern terms would be known as a cabinet. The process of constitutionalism in Islam elaborates on another very important aspect which is the spirit and legitimacy of the constitutions or the laws. In a modern western form the will of the people through the social contract is inculcated into the process of law making and the state is subservient to the will of the people. The people of the state are its highest authority and they delegate power to their representative to act on their behalf. However, in Islam people of the state are subject to Allah and his word and therefore all rules and laws must be in conformity with the Quran and ahadith (Maududi, 1955). Although, people are free to choose their own representative or leader and create their laws but they would remain subjects of Allah. It is important to note that the status of the Quran when compared to any western form of government is like a constitution; a constitution which is irrevocable and un-amendable.

In Islam the need on for consultations is stressed upon, through the process of shura. Evidence of the prophet (pbuh) allowing discussion and seeking advice from his companions depicts that this method is given high value. Most caliphs turned to shura as after the death of the prophet (pbuh) the path for revelations and god’s word being sent on earth had been closed. The process of consultations and discussion was perhaps the only means to address and derive rules in compliance with Allah’s wish and the will of the people. The need to consult and discuss was also stressed through the Quran and therefore it was not deducted through ijthad but through the book. The process of shura can limit the range of issues to be discussed, as like any other modern parliament, discussing either issues of national and strategic importance or issues of technical expertise. The more contentious question is whether the decision by the shura is binding o the ruler or not (Eugene Cotan, 1999). The Quranic verse and the ahadith provide ambiguity on the issue, allowing it to be interpreted rigidly or flexibly. In both cases the aim is to dissolve the authoritarian nature of the ruler and bring him God’s rule and the will of the people. In modern day constitutionalism the question of selecting the shura would arise. Past precedence dictates that people of the shura like the leader should be of knowledgeable mind and pious nature. In earlier days the member of the shura were well known in the community, but population growth has allowed moving past this system and an elected shura is permissible in accordance to the basic principle of eligibility.

Again a mix of selected and elected advisors is the personal choice of the leader with personal discretion to choose and remove or follow the norms of election and legislative process. A parallel could be drawn to the system of parliamentary democracy being highly close to the most preferred Islamic system of constitutionalism. The majlis-e-shura i.e. the parliament, is elected by the people for a specific period of time with certain eligibility criteria, not as stringent as put forward by earlier Islamic practices. Then the process of forming a government, although a vote is held to choose the head of government, the process of bay’ah does loosely exist. Similarly, the head of government is not bound to listen to the parliament or the cabinet but has to adhere to legislations passed by the majlis-e-shura ad prefers consultations on important issues. In Islamic concept the judiciary is again fairly similar to the western model and is subjugated under the writ of the Quran. The Qadhi i.e. has the right to call the leader of the state to court but is not allowed to pass any ruling in conflict to the preaching’s of the Quran and Sunnah. The process like any other model of constitutionalism is selective based on extreme knowledge, most likely a mujtahid and piety (Asad, 1980).

The very important issue of constitutionalism to consider is the method of checks and balances. The concept of not having any one corridor of power over-arching the other is fairly important. In western constitutionalism the method is insured thorugh the speration of the three arms of state and then limits their power through the constitution. In the case of Islam the onus and burden is on the individual, the core fundamental of punishment in the afterlife play an important role. The individual should acquire a self regulating mechanism of fixing mistakes and dealing with others, in light with the Quran and the Sunnah. Islam perhaps differs in institutionalising the checks and balances and prefers the individual to act in good faith and provide welfare and relief in situations of disagreements and discomfort. As mentioned in the beginning, Islam puts high importance on the behaviour of an individual and the world is merely a testing ground for the afterlife. Therefore, past example have shown the various caliphs and leaders have either acted in good faith or taken decisions on their personal characteristics or judgements, leaving room for development and self correction. The majlis-e-shura can recommend and advise, however, it has to respect the authority and the decision taken by the leader of the time. To ensure checks and balances Islam enforces more need and evaluation whilst selecting the leader or the council than later putting on checks on them. In contrary to the mainstream belief of Islam, the clergy in the Iranian setup who have established the modern Islamic constitution and try and replicate Islamic constitutionalism have created checks and balances (Ayatollah Yayha Noori, 1987). The mainstream schools of thought i.e. the Sunni schools differ in involving clergy between man and God.

The more important question is further development of Islamic constitutionalism. Many schools in the Sunni thought have closed the doors of ijtihad and find it un-necessary to involve in further expansion of law (Vikor, 2005). The argument of precedence versus activism has led many differences and counter productivity. Though Islam permits the use of ijtihad through the existence of civilisation, the growth or evolution of Islam constitutionalism has become stagnant. Islamic constitutionalism has been present since the beginning of the religion and the emphasis on society has been seen through historical evidences. Various caliphates employed various methods in order to address the issues of the time. Whether in Baghdad, Damascus or Istanbul till the doors of ijtihad were open, development on constitutionalism was constant. Exchange of ideas and issues amongst the scholarly circles and libraries permitted research into various socio-political issues. Worthy to note is the fact that Islamic constitutionalism has existed way before the advent of modern western constitutionalism. The examples of ijithad and governance date back to 7^th and 8^th century, when Europe was still under despotic monarchy and Vatican’s rule. In the times when it was perhaps sin to challenge the clergy and the concept of women voting was frowned upon, scholars of Islam were writing principles of economic, trade and welfare. Islamic constitutionalism in spirit is a fairly flexible concept and allows allot of room to develop.

To conclude on the notion of constitutionalism and Islam, I would reflect back on the earlier definition of constitutionalism. As understood from the beginning, the term encompasses a very broad meaning and does not reflect any specific part of government, rather discusses the issue of governance and the social contract. The western concept was equated well with the less explored concept of Islam. Many societies and individuals do not connect Islam with modernity and term it rigid, however evidence suggest that Islamic constitutionalism is perhaps the most fluid and flexible concept, when compared with other forms of governance. The will and the consent of the people are of the utmost importance with respect to the core sources of law. Islamic constitutionalism moves forward in analysing and changing according to needs of the society. The ineptness of many scholars and leaders for not developing the process further and causing stagnation in the scholarly material has led to disillusionment of the system. Many are unaware of Islamic constitutionalism and many relate it to Taliban-ization or Saudi-ization (Riphenburg, 2005). After the fall of the caliphate less work has been done to inculcate Islamic systems within the existing political framework. Countries such as Egypt and Iran have tried to explore and implement, but have faced severe criticisms by the corrupt practices. Countries like Pakistan initiated on the right path of laying down the correct principles but, as history reveals they too have been shelved and misinterpreted.

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[1] as was perceived by Islamic scholars for a few weeks before actual investigation

[2] To follow prayer by hearing an echo of the Imam is not permitted, as you are considered too far away and you’re receiving of information too delayed